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PREAMBLE
This article is gratefully dedicated to Professor Richard S. Sul-
livan by Robert S. Fuchs, Regional Director of the National Labor
Relations Board for New England, and Henry M. Kelleher, a part-
ner in the law firm of Foley, Hoag & Eliot of Boston, Mas-
sachusetts.
Co-author Fuchs attended Boston College Law School with
Professor Sullivan in the days when the law school was located at 11
Beacon Street and Copley Square, successively. Years later, upon
the invitation of Professor Sullivan, co-author Fuchs was, for fifteen
years, privileged to conduct a seminar in labor law following Profes-
sor Sullivan's labor law course. The class was conducted on Satur-
day mornings and initially combined the night and day school stu-
dents, many of whom desired to specialize in the field of labor law.
Thereafter, some twenty to forty percent of the class succeeded in
obtaining appointments with the Board as trial attorneys and many
of those have "graduated" from the Board and are making their
mark in private practice, specializing in labor relations. Among
them are Henry M. Kelleher, co-author of this article and a former
student of Dick Sullivan.
Those students who took the seminar after taking Professor
Sullivan's course were a source of constant amazement, for it
seemed inconceivable that they could absorb and retain so much
knowledge of the subject matter in so short a period of time. This,
then, is our perfect tribute to Professor Richard Sullivan. There are
many superb teachers of labor relations in the New England area,
but in our experience no one has demonstrated a greater talent for
molding the future of budding labor-management lawyers or has
obtained finer results than has Dick Sullivan. In his quiet, unassum-
ing manner, always avoiding the limelight, he has devoted his life to
preparing young men and women for the extraordinary success
which so many of them now enjoy.
The purpose of this article is to update and enlarge an article by
co-authors Fuchs and Kelleher which originally appeared in this law
review in 1968. It is a self-contained article which will not require
the reader to refer back to the original 1968 article. Rosemary Pye, a
third-year student at Cornell Law School, assisted in researching the
new material and adding the section entitled "Union Responsibil-
ity."
I. INTRODUCTION
Administration of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act)'
involves a process designed to prevent as well as remedy the com-
' 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-87 (1970).
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mission of unfair labor practices. Section 10(c) of the Act provides
that where the National Labor Relations Board (the NLRB or the
Board) makes an unfair labor practice determination and issues a
cease-and-desist order, it may also take such affirmative action,
including reinstatement of employees, with or without back pay, as
will effectuate the policies of the Act. 2 In addition to cases involving
discharges and layoffs, back pay may be ordered to remedy dis-
criminatory demotions, transfers, pay reductions or other changes in
employment status involving financial loss. 3 The back pay order
generally provides that employees shall be made whole for any loss
of pay resulting from the unlawful action of the employer, who is
required to pay each individual a sum of money equal to the amount
which that individual would normally have earned between the date
of the discrimination and, in an appropriate case, the date of the
employer's offer of reinstatement, less the individual's earnings dur-
ing that period. A typical remedial order of the Board provides that
the respondent employer shall
OFFER to the employees named below immediate and full
reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent
positions without prejudice to any seniority or other rights
and privileges previously enjoyed, and make them whole
for any loss of pay suf ered as a result of the discrimination
against them, with interest thereon at 6 percent. 4
The simplicity of this order is deceptive, and its application in
individual cases gives rise to a myriad of complex problems and
extensive litigation before the Board and the courts. This article is
designed to trace the history and development of back pay law and
provide a handy substantive reference to back pay proceedings.
Computation of back pay is not undertaken during the hearing
on the merits of an unfair labor practice charge, but during a
separate proceeding following the issuance of the Board order, or, if
1 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) 0970).
3 Nabors v. NLRB, 323 F.2d 686, 690, 54 L.R.R.M. 2259 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
376 U.S. 911 (1964). See, e.g., Hollywood Brands, Inc., 169 N.L.R.B. 691, 67 L.R.R.M.
1371 (1968) (discriminatory failure to give employee opportunity to qualify for higher-paying
job held to entitle employee both to the opportunity and to back pay even if he does not
qualify); Leeds & Northrup Co., 162 N.L.R.B. 987, 64 L.R.R.M. 1110 (1967) (unilateral
discontinuance of supplemental compensation plan triggered remedy); Hall Elec. Co., 111
N.L.R.B. 68, 35 L.R.R.M. 1414 (1955) (employees discriminatorily transferred entitled to
back pay for loss of overtime); Wyandotte Chem. Corp., 108 N.L.R.B. 1406, 34 L.R.R.M.
1220 (1954), enforced, 35 L.R.R.M. 2533 (6th Cir. 1955) (discriminatory denial of overtime
work); Dinion Coil Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 1435, 29 L.R.R.M. 1049 (1951), enforced, 201 F.2d 484,
31 L.R.R.M, 2223 (2d Cir. 1952) (reduction in pay); Rockaway News Supply Co., 94
N.L.R.B. 1056, 28 L.R.R.M. 1133 (1951) (discriminatory work assignments and denial of
extra pay when shifts were changed without notice).
NLRB Form 577 (emphasis added).
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the substantive questions are appealed, following a court decree
enforcing or affirming the orders This is generally referred to as the
compliance stage of the proceeding. The parties to the proceeding
are the General Counsel of the NLRB, the respondent (employer or
union) and the charging party. The employees who will benefit if the
General Counsel prevails are referred to as claimants.
In order to compute back pay, the Board must reconstruct the
economic life of each claimant and place him in the same financial
position he would have enjoyed had he not been discriminated
against. Thus, it is necessary to determine as accurately as possible
the sum he would have earned in the employment he lost through
the discrimination. This is known as "gross back pay." The Board
must then determine how he actually fared financially during the
period between the discrimination and the reinstatement offer, the
period known as the "back pay period," and then subtract any sum
earned during this period. This amount is called "interim earnings."
After certain expenses are deducted from interim earnings, the result
is the amount of back pay due, the "net back pay." For the present,
it will be useful to set out the formula in its simplest form:
Net Back Pay = Gross Back Pay — (Interim Earnings
—Expenses).
This article will first discuss the historical development of back
pay as a remedy and will then cover in detail the computation of
each of the elements of net back pay: gross back pay, interim
earnings and expenses. Then, after an elucidation of the burdens of
proof and procedure before the Board in the back pay proceeding,
the article will consider certain knotty problems which arise fre-
quently enough to warrant specialized consideration: strike situa-
tions, subcontracting situations, plant closures and relocations, the
liability of purchasers of the respondent's business operation, the
claims of creditors, union responsibility, and the problem of the
personal liability of corporate officers and union agents in the back
pay area. Finally, the article will conclude with a discussion of the
back pay remedy in refusal-to-bargain situations.
II. THE HISTORY OF BACK PAY
In the congressional debates preceding the passage of the
Wagner Act6 and the Taft-Hartley Act,' there is scarcely any men-
tion of the back pay remedy. There is certainly nothing in the
3 See 29 C.F,R. 1.§ 102.52-.59 (1968).
6 49 Stat. 450 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-87 (1970).
7 61 Stat. 136'(1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-87 (1970).
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legislative histories of these acts which has proved useful to courts in
construing the language of section 10(c).
Development of the intricacies' of the remedy was thus left to
the Board, subject to a limited review by the courts. This develop-
ment began with Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 8 where the Su-
preme Court first stated that back pay is a remedy and not a
punitive device. Prior to Republic . Steel, the Board required em-
ployers not only to make whole the wrongfully discharged employee
but also to reimburse the Government for money it had paid the
employee while he worked on relief projects. 9 The Court held that
this type of order was punitive rather than remedial, and therefore
invalid, for Congress had not intended to vest in the Board discre-
tion to devise measures in the nature of penalties or fines in order to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
The back pay remedy underwent further evolution in Phelps
Dodge Corp. v. NLRB," when the Court struck down the Board's
policy of deducting from gross back pay only actual interim earnings
and not amounts representing other losses willfully incurred by the
claimant." In argument before the Supreme Court, the Board urged
acceptance of its simple formula, contending that it would otherwise
be faced with an impossible administrative burden. 12 The Supreme
Court, however, rejected the Board's argument. While acknowledg-
ing the mechanical simplicity of the rule propounded by the Board,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court, stated: "But the
advantages of a simple rule must be balanced against the impor-
tance of taking fair account, in a civilized legal system, of every
socially desirable factor in the final judgment.""
While the Supreme Court in Phelps Dodge placed a considera-
ble administrative burden upon the Board, it also acknowledged the
broad discretion entrusted by Congress to the Board in fashioning its
remedial provisions. In this regard, the Court stated:
Congress could not catalogue all the devices and
strategems for circumventing the policies of the Act. Nor
could it define the whole gamut of remedies to effectuate
these policies in an infinite variety of specific situations.
Congress met these difficulties by leaving the adaption of
means to end to' the empiric process of administration. The
8 311 U.S. 7 (1940).
9 See id, at 8- 9.
1 ° 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
11 E.g., by failure to 'seek or accept other . 	 employment.
12 313 U.S. at 198.	 •	 I
" Id.
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exercise of the process was committed to the. Board, sub-
ject to limited judicial review."
In subsequent cases, the Court has reemphasized this principle,
holding that a back pay order of the Board "should stand unless it
can be shown that the order is a patent attempt to achieve ends
other than those which can fairly be said to effectuate the policies of
the Act." 15 In NLRB v. Brown & Root, Inc., 1, 6 the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals described the scope of judicial review as follows:
It is not the function of this Court to try the case de novo
or to substitute its own appraisal of the evidence for that of
the Board. If the Board has conceived the law correctly, if
it has not acted arbitrarily or capriciously, and if its
findings are supported by "substantial evidence on the
record considered as a whole," they are conclusive and
binding on this Court even though we might have made
different findings upon an independent consideration of the
same evidence.' 7
The "broad reach" of the Board's discretion to determine "how the
effect of unfair labor practices may be expunged" has long been
established. 18
Though back pay is a remedy, it is designed to vindicate not the
private rights of the employees involved but the policies of the
statute itself. It is a remedy serving the public interest and designed
to correct a public wrong, and the compensation inuring to the
discriminatees is not theirs as a matter of right but is viewed as an
incidental consequence of 'the Board's remedial process.° It was
established in the earliest days of the Wagner Act that a back pay
proceeding is not comparable to a suit for damages in which the
litigants are entitled to a trial by jury. 20
 Pursuant to this well-settled
14 Id. at 194.
75 NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 346-47 (1953); Virginia Elec. & Power
Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 540 (1943).
I° 311 F.2d 447, 52 L.R.R.M. 2115 (8th Cir. 1963); enforcing 132 N.L.R.B. 486, 48
L.R.R.M. 1391 (1961).
17 311 F.2d at 451, 52 L.R.R.M. at 2117-18. See also Nabors v. NLRB, 323 F.2d 686,
692, 54 L.R.R.M. 2259, 2263 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 911 (1964); Universal
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
NLRB v. District 50, UMW, 355 U.S. 453, 458 (1958); NLRB v. Link-Belt Co., 311
U.S. 584, 600 (1940).
19 Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 235-36 (1938) (the Board may not
punish a particular employer); Salmon & Cowin, Inc. v. NLRB, 148 F.2d 941, 16 L.R.R.M.
655 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 758 (1945) ("not ... to vindicate ... private rights . ,
but the National Labor Relations Act"); NLRB v. Carlisle Lumber Co., 99 F.2d 533, 3
L.R,R.M. 725 (9th Cir. 1938) (the purpose of effectuating the policies of the Act is not one of
rewarding an individual employee),
2° NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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principle, the Board held that "the desires of individuals cannot be
allowed to block the public purpose behind the Board's requirement
that they be made whole." 21
 In addition, laches are not generally
available to respondents as a defense. In Southland Manufacturing
Corp. v. NLRB, 22 no merit was found in the employer's contention
that the Board was guilty of laches in instituting back pay proceed-
ings five years after the original unfair labor practice decision, since
laches may not defeat an action by the government to enforce a
public right.
Accordingly, the Board does not consider any strike settlement
agreement between an employer and a union as binding upon it and
will not recognize it unless it effectuates the policies of the Act. 23
Neither do releases or waivers of back pay executed by claimants
bar a back pay order against the employer. 24 The courts have found
employers in civil contempt for causing employees to endorse to
them checks for back pay. 25
 Further, it has been held that a back
pay order may contain the names of employees even though they
requested that their names be removed from the complaint issued by
the General Counsel. 26 The Board reasons that the Act, designed as
it is to vindicate a public policy, precludes individuals from relin-
quishing back pay as a matter of right where the remedy is neces-
sary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
In its decisions immediately following the Phelps Dodge case,
the Board rigidly interpreted the Supreme Court's mandate, restrict-
ing its inquiry in the area of willful loss to the question whether the
employee had unjustifiably refused to accept or had given up desira-
ble new employment. However, in 1943, the Board announced a
broader policy, to apply for the duration of World War II, under
which it permitted an employer to present evidence not only as to
whether a discharged employee had unjustifiably refused to accept
or had given up suitable employment, but also as to whether he had
made a "reasonable effort" to obtain such employment. 27
 The Board
added that it would regard registration with an office of the United
21 J.B. Wood, 95 N.L.R.B. 633, 642, 28 L.R.R.M. 1358, 1361 (1951).
22 475 F.2d 414, 82 L.R.R.M. 2897 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See also NLRB v. J.H. Rutter-Rex
Mfg. Co., 396 U.S. 258 (1969), rev'g 399 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1968), in which the Supreme
Court, reversing the court of appeals, held that even if the delay violated the Administrative
Procedure Act, a reviewing court may not interfere with the Board's discretion to balance the
rights of the employer and the employees.
22 F.W. Judge Optical Works, Inc., 78 N.L.R.B. 385, 386, 22 L.R.R.M. 1217, 1219
(1948).
24 NLRB v. Threads, Inc., 308 F.2d 1, 8, 51 L.R.R.M. 2074, 2079-80 (4th Cir. 1962);
Waterman S.S. Corp. v. NLRB, 119 F.2d 760, 763, 8 L.R.R.M. 670, 671 (5th Cir. 1941).
25 E.g., NLRB v. Lawley, 182 F.2d 798, 26'L.R.R.M. 2267 (5th Cir. 1950).
J.B. Wood, 95 N.L.R.B. 633, 28 L.R.R.M. 1358 (1951).
21 Ohio Public Serv. Co., 52 N.L.R.B. 725, 729, 13 L.R.R.M. 30, 31 (1943), enforced,
144 F.2d 252, 14 L.R.R.M. 953 (6th Cir. 1944),
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States Employment Service as "conclusive evidence" that the em-
ployee had made a reasonable search for work. 28
In 1950, the Board decided to continue this rule under
peacetime employment conditions. It also extended the "conclusive
evidence" principle to cover registration with a state as well as a
federal employment office and elaborated on what it meant by
"desirable" new employment, explaining that a back pay claimant is
neither required to accept employment that is not the substantial
equivalent of his former position nor compelled to accept employ-
ment that requires him to leave his home and incur expenses. 29
Again, in 1957, the Board modified the "conclusive evidence"
rule, holding that henceforth it would not give conclusive weight to
registration with a government employment office but would treat it
as a factor to be given as much weight as the circumstances of each
case demand. 3 ° In the same case, the Board refused to adopt the
recommendation of a trial examiner (now called an administrative
law judge) who had held that, failing to find "substantially equiva-
lent" employment, the employee should be required to "lower his
sights" and accept less remunerative employment.
III. THE COMPUTATION OF BACK PAY
A. ; Generally
As noted previously, back pay is determined by first computing
the total amount which the claimant would have earned if he had
not been discriminated against by respondent and had remained in
his employ. Certain deductions are then made from this figure, and
the result is the amount of net pay actually due the claimant. It is
the purpose of this section of the article to explore first the elements
of gross back pay and then the deductions which are made from that
figure. We will then consider the mechanical, mathematical compu-
tation of the award.
B. The Elements of Gross Back Pay
Gross back pay is the amount which would have accrued to a
claimant during the back pay period had there been no discrimina-
tion. In addition to basic wages, this includes promotions, 3 ' wage
2 ° Id.
29
 Harvest Queen Mill & Elevator Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 320, 321-22, 26 L.R.R.M. 1189,
1191 (1950).
3° Southern Silk Mills, Inc., 116 N:L.R.B. 769, 38 L.R.R.M. 1317 (1956), enforcement
denied, 242 F.2d 697, 39 L.R.R.M. 2647 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 821 (1957).





 bonuses, 33 overtime pay34 and other incidents of the
employment relationship such as a taxicab driver's tips." The com-
putation of these amounts requires an evaluation of the employer's
policies on promotions, layoffs, rehirings and seniority, and of the
availability of employment during the back pay period. Records
commonly used in computing gross back pay include payroll re-
cords, personnel history cards, quarterly social security tax returns,
production records and daily time cards.
The selection of the gross back pay formula to be used is not
mechanical but depends upon the circumstances of each case. One
of the most reliable methods of computing gross back pay, known as
the "comparability formula," is based upon the earnings of the
claimant's replacement or of other similarly classified employees in
the same plant who performed comparable work during the same
period. In appropriate circumstances the Board employs the "ad-
justed average hours" formula, under which gross back pay of each
claimant is arrived at by computing the average hours of all em-
ployees working in each claimant's job classification for each of the
back pay periods and multiplying the result by the appropriate
hourly wage rate. 36
There are some variations of this formula. In Rice Lake Cream-
ery Co ., 37 the gross back pay was computed on the basis of the
average number of straight time and overtime hours worked by all
full-time employees who performed production work during the
back pay period, rather than on the basis of the hours worked only
by each claimant's replacement. Under this formula, the resulting
averages of time and overtime are multiplied by the appropriate
hourly wage rate of each production employee discriminated against
to arrive at the amount of gross back pay due each such employee
for each quarter. 38 In Oman Construction Co., 39 the Board, to
arrive at gross back pay, averaged the earnings of two other em-
32
 E.g., Peyton Packing Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 1275, 47 L.R.R.M. 1170 (1961); Indianapolis
Wire-Bound Box Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 617, 26 L.R.R.M. 1005 (1950).
" E.g., Crater Lake Mach. Co., 131 N,L.R.B. 1106, 48 L.R.R.M. 1211 (1961); Indus-
trial Fabricating, Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 162, 41 L.R.R.M, 1038 (1957), enforced sub nom.
NLRB v. Mackneish, 272 F.2d 184, 45 L.R.R.M. 2136 (6th Cir, 1959); Dinion Coil Co., 96
N.L.R.B. 1435, 1461, 29 L.R.R.M. 1049, 1050 (1951), enforced, 201 F.2d 484, 31 L.R.R.M.
2223 (2d Cir. 1952).
34
 E.g., Marcus Trucking Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1378, 1379-80, 50 L.R.R.M. 1441, 1442
(1962).
15
 City Transp. Co., 131 N.L.R.B. 814, 48 L.R.R.M. 1146 (1961), enforced, 303 F.2d
299, 50 L.R.R.M. 2330 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 920 (1962).
36
 Brown & Root, Inc., 132 N.L.R.B. 486, 488, 48 L.R.R.M. 1391 (1961).
37
 151 N.L.R.B. 1113, 58 L.R.R.M. 1542 (1965), enforced in part, 365 F.2d 888, 62
L.R.RM. 2332 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
" Id.
39
 144 N.L.R.B. 1534, 1536, 53 L.R.R.M. 2029 (1963).
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ployees who drove equipment similar to that which the claimant
would have driven but for the discrimination. 40 In East Texas Steel
Castings Co.,'" the Board, with court approval, required the re-
spondent employer to increase the wages of the claimants to the
hourly rate of pay that other welders of similar skill and ability were
earning on the date of their reinstatement.
On the other hand, there are circumstances where the com-
parability formula would not serve to make the claimants whole.
For example, where an employer was high bidder on a government
contract and discriminatorily refused to hire the employees of his
predecessor who had been represented by a union, the Board com-
puted gross back pay at the rate the employees had received under
the union contract rather than at the lesser rate paid their
replacements. 42
In a number of recent cases the Board, with approval of the
courts, has held that the use of a seniority type formula is a rational
and appropriate method of computing gross back pay whether or
not the concept of seniority is a principal determinate in the person-
nel policies of the particular employer. In Superior Roofing Co., 43
the Board applied such a back pay formula on the concept that,
even though the employer did not hire or terminate employees on
the basis of seniority, the use of a seniority formula to compute
earnings of "a representative employee" resulted in a reasonable
approximation of what an unlawfully discharged employee would
have earned during the back !pay period. The Board's use of the
seniority formula in those circumstances was endorsed by the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit."
Again, in Congdon Dye Casting Co., 45 the Board fashioned a
back pay remedy based upon the seniority concept. In this case the
employer had granted wage increases at one of two plants prior to a
Board election, but had denied increases at the other plant on the
basis of anti-union considerations. The employer asserted in mitiga-
tion of its back pay liability that the discharged employees would
have been laid off even absent discrimination. The Board rejected
that contention, however, and in fashioning a remedy utilized the
seniority concept even though the facts indicated that the respondent
4° Accord, Pugh & Barr, Inc., 110 N.L.R.B. 1353, 35 L.R.R.M. 1259 (1954), enforced,
231 F.2d 558, 37 L.R.R.M. 2827 (4th Cir. 1956); C & D Coal Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 799, 27
L.R.R.M. 1472 (1951).
4 ' 116 N.L.R.B. 1336, 38 L.R.R.M. 1470 (1956), enforced, 255 F.2d 284, 42 L.R.R.M.
2109 (5th Cir. 1958).
42 New England Tank Indus., Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 598, 56 L.R.R.M. 1253 (1964).
43 186 N.L.R.B. 542, 76 L.R.R.M. 1701 (1970), enforced, 460 F.2d 1240, 80 L.R.R.M.
2458 (9th Cir. 1972).
44 460 F.2d 1240, 80 L.R.R.M. 2458 (9th Cir. 1972).
45 176 N.L.R.B. 482, 71 L.R.R.M. 1285 (1969).
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did not follow seniority in implementation of its personnel policies.
The Board stated that the seniority concept is a "normal industrial
practice" which may properly be utilized by the Board in fashioning
remedial orders.
While in some circumstances the former earnings of the claim-
ant are used to compute his gross back pay, in cases of mass
discrimination the Board has on occasion employed a lump sum
back pay figure. For example, where the restored work force is
considerably smaller than before a strike or shutdown, the Board
has computed a lump sum consisting of the wages paid to those
working in the bargaining unit between the time that the employer
reopens the plant and the time that he complies with the Board
order to offer reinstatement to the employees. The money is divided
as equitably as possible among the strikers illegally refused rein-
statement upon their unconditional request therefor. 46
Where employment is seasonal in character, the Board recog-
nizes this factor in its back pay computations and, in order to avoid
making a claimant more than whole, excludes those periods during
which the claimant would not have worked. 47
 The Board, with the
approval of the courts of appeals, has approximated gross back pay
in situations where an exact amount cannot be arrived at."
In considering whether to include in back pay bonuses, gifts
and the like, the Board has taken the position that the "make
whole" concept does not turn on whether the payment was wholly
obligatory or gratuitous, but rather on the principle of restoring the
status quo ante. In one case, 49 the employer instituted a
profit-sharing plan based upon the regular hours of employment
each employee had worked during a given period, the sole eligibility
requirement being that the employee be on the payroll at the time
the payment was made. On a number of occasions, he specifically
told employees this was not part of their pay. The profit-sharing
49 Jack G. Buncher, 164 N.L.R.B. 340, 65 L.R.R.M. 1139 (1965); F.W. Woolworth Co.
v. NLRB, 121 F.2d 658, 663, 8 L.R.R.M. 515, 519 (2d Cir. 1941).
47 E.g., Sebastapol Apple Growers Union, 118 N.L.R.B. 1181, 40 L.R.R.M. 1355
(1957), enforced in part, 269 F.2d 705, 44 L.R.R.M. 2755 (9th Cir. 1959).
4$ Golay & Co. v. NLRB, 447 F.2d 290, 76 L.R.R.M. 1110 (7th Cir. 1971); NLRB v.
Rice Lake Creamery Co., 365 F.2d 888, 62 L.R.R.M. 2332 (D.C. Cir. 1966); NLRB v.
Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 358 F.2d 94, 97, 61 L.R.R.M. 2655, 2656 (5th Cir. 1966);
NLRB v. Ellis & Watts Prods., Inc., 344 F.2d 67, 58 L.R.R.M. 2790 (6th Cir. 1965); NLRB
v. Decker, 322 F.2d 238, 245, 54 L.R.R.M. 2063, 2069-70 (8th Cir. 1963); NLRB v. Brown &
Root, Inc., 311 F.2d 447, 52 L.R.R.M. 2115 (8th Cir. 1963); NLRB v. Ozark Hardwood Co.,
282 F.2d 1, 7-8, 46 L.R.R.M. 2823, 2827-28 (8th Cir. 1960); NLRB v. East Texas Steel
Castings Co., 255 F.2d 284, 42 L.R.R.M. 2109 (5th Cir. 1958); NLRB v. Kartarik, Inc., 227
F.2(1 190, 192-93, 37 L.R.R.M. 2104, 2105-06 (8th Cir. 1955); Marlin-Rockwell Corp. v.
NLRB, 133 F.2d 258, 260-61, 11 L.R.R.M. 808, 810-11 (2d Cir. 1943).
49
 Nabors v, NLRB, 323 F.2d 686, 54 L.R.R.M. 2259 (5th Cir, 1963), modifying and
enforcing 134 N.L.R.B. 1078, 49 L.R.R.M. 1289 (1961), cert, denied, 376 U.S. 911 (1964).
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plan, with apparent tacit agreement of the Wage and Hour Division
of the Department of Labor was not taken into consideration in
determining the regular hourly rates of employees, nor was it
considered in determining the employer's premium rate for coverage
under the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Act, which rate is
computed on a percentage of compensation paid to employees. It
was, however, included in the employees' W-2 income tax withhold-
ing forms. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated:
The Board's discretion to take such affirmative remedial
action as will effectuate the purposes of the Act includes
more than placing the employee in position to assert con-
tractual or legally enforceable obligations. "Back pay" as
used in section 10(c) includes the money, whether gratui-
tous or not, which it is reasonably found that the employee
would actually have received in the absence of the unlaw-
ful discrimination."
Thus, the amount of profit shares paid to all employees on the
basis of specified percentages of the employees' wages, even though
purely voluntary and within the discretion of the employer, were
included in the back-pay computation. In another case, the Board
included in its computation of gross back pay $675 per year in prizes
which an unlawfully discharged salesman would have won in man-
ufacturer sales contests had he not been discharged."
In Niles-Bement-Pond Co., 52 the respondent had for many
years given "Christmas gifts" to most of its employees. These gifts
consisted of money, the amount being either a percentage of the
recipient's entire earnings or his pay for a designated period. The
respondent, however, had refused to discuss this subject with the
recognized union, contending .that it had no legal duty to bargain
about gifts. The Board found that Christmas bonuses constitute
wages within the meaning of the Act. In agreement with the Board,
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated:
It does, of course, merely beg the question to call them
"gifts" and to argue, however persuasively, _that gifts per se
are not a required subject for collective bargaining. But if
these gifts were so tied to the remuneration which em-
ployees received for their work that they were in fact a part
" 323 F.2d at 690, 54 L.R.R.M. at 2262.
5 ' Nickey Chevrolet Sales, Inc., 195 N.L.R.B. 395, 79 L.R.R.M. 1460 (1972).
52 97 N.L.R.B. 165, 29 L.R.R.M. 1074 (1951), enforced, 199 F.2d 713, 31 L.R.R.M.
2057 (2d Cir. 1952).
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of it, they were in reality wages, and so within the
statute. 53
The court equated such bonuses with other special kinds of remun-
eration such as pensions, retirement plans or group insurance, sub-
jects upon which an employer is required to bargain. 54
A sampling of other Christmas gift cases discloses that the
Board, with court approval, has included clothing previously given
as a bonus as part of the gross back pay." In Story Oldsmobile,
Inc., 56 the Board held that even if Christmas bonuses were discre-
tionary and voluntary they should be added to the gross back pay of
commission salesmen who had been discriminatorily discharged.
In Rice Lake Creamery Co.," the Board held that the claimants
were entitled to amounts equivalent to the employer's contribution
to a pension insurance plan accruing during the back pay period.
Moreover, the Board held that neither the employees' share in the
annual insurance premium nor monies received as the cash surren-
der value of pension policies constituted allowable deductions from
gross back pay. Here the trust plan provided for an annuity cover-
ing eligible employees at age 65 as well as a life insurance policy.
Employees participated in premium payments. Respondent ceased
paying premiums during a strike and entered into a private agree-
ment with employees, who executed releases in return for the cash
surrender value of the policies. As heretofore noted, it is well settled
that private agreements to which the Board is not a party are not
binding on the Board in the exercise of its authority to enforce the
public policy of the Act." Thus, the Board held that to permit
deductions from gross back pay would be to allow respondent to
benefit from its own wrongdoing.
Special problems are created respecting back pay claimants
who were compensated in their employment on a commission basis.
The Board's handling of such a situation is indicated by its decision
in Folk Chevralet. 59
 In computing back pay for discriminatorily
53 NLRB v. Niles-Bement-Pond Co., 199 F.2d 713, 714, 31 L.R.R.M. 2057, 2058 (2d
Cir. 1952).
54 See McLoughlin Mfg. Corp. v. NLRB, 463 F.2d 907, 80 L.R.R.M. 2716 (D.C. Cir.
1972); NLRB v. Electric Steam Radiator Corp., 321 F.2d 733, 736-37, 43 L.R.R.M. 2092,
2095 (6th Cir. 1963); NLRB v. Toffenetti Restaurant Co., 311 F.2d 219, 51 L.R.R.M. 2601
(2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 977 (1963); NLRB v. Wheeling Pipe Line, Inc., 229
F.2d 391, 395-96, 37 L.R.R.M. 2403, 2406-07 (8th Cir. 1956).
" NLRB v. Moss Planing Mill Co., 206 F.2d 557, 559, 32 L.R.R.M. 2530, 2532 (4th
Cir. 1953).
56 145 N.L.R.B. 1647, 55 L.R.R.M. 1217 (1964).
57 151 N.L.R.B. 1113, 1126-29, 58 L.R.R.M. 1542, 1544-45 (1965).
59 See text at notes 23-26 supra.
59 176 N.L.R.B. 277, 76 L.R.R.M. 1701 (1970). See also Story Oldsmobile, 145
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discharged automobile salesmen who had worked on a commission
basis, the Board, selecting a prior year as the base period, estab-
lished a ratio between the earnings of the four full-time salesmen
who worked during the entire back pay period, and the earnings of
the discriminatees. The Board then applied this ratio for each dis-
criminatee to the average earnings of the four full-time salesmen for
relevant quarters and days of the following year, and then to various
portions of the back pay period. Through this method the Board
determined the commissions which each discriminatee would nor-
mally have been expected to have earned in the portion of the back
pay period relevant to his discharge situation.
Claimants are also entitled to the value of their accrued vaca-
tions where they suffered losses attributable to the discrimination."
However, where employees are paid when the plant is closed for
vacation, they receive back pay for this period but are not allowed
vacation pay in addition since this type of program involves pay-
ment in lieu of, and not in addition to, their regular pay." Further,
no allowance for vacation benefits accrues while claimants are out of
work during a strike. The Board reasons that vacations are a form
of deferred wages to which employees are not entitled during a
strike regardless of whether the strike is economic or is caused or
prolonged by the respondent's unfair labor practices. Thus, in one
case, the respondent's vacation plan provided for one week's vaca-
tion aftei one year of work. If strike time had been counted, claim-
ants who were reinstated but no longer employed by respondent
would have been entitled to this benefit. By deducting strike time,
they worked for less than a year and were not eligible for vacation
pay. 62
An important factor in assessing gross back pay is the avail-
ability of employment at the• respondent's plant. The Board tolls
back pay during those periods where a discriminatee would have
been laid off or separated from his employment in any event as the
result of a legitimate general reduction of personnel. 63 However,
N.L.R.B. 1647, 55 L.R.R.M. 1217 (1964); American Mfg. Co., 167 N.L•R.B. 520, 66
L.R.R.M. 1122 (1967).
60 Brophy Engraving Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 719, 725, 28 L.R.R.M. 1096, 1098 (1951).
61 Moss Planing Mill Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 933, 35 L.R.R.M. 1165 (1954), set aside on
other grounds, 224 F.2d 702, 36 L.R.RM. 2534 (4th Cir. 1955).
62 Mooney Aircraft, Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 1057, 57 L.R.R.M. 1133 (1964); General Elec.
Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 510, 23 L.R.R.M. 1094 (1948).
63 Ellis & Watts Prods., Inc., 143 N.L.R.B. 1269, 53 L.R.R.M. 1491 (1963), enforced,
344 F.2d 67, 58 L.R.R.M. 2791 (6th Cir. 1965); Cleaver-Brooks Mfg. Corp., 120 N.L.R.B.
1135, 42 L.R.R.M. 1130 (1958), set aside on other grounds, 264 F.2d 637, 43 L.R.R.M. 2722
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 817 (1959); H. Paul Prigg, 69 N.L.R.B. 97, 18 L.R.R.M.
1195 (1946), enforced, 172 F.2d 948, 23 L.R.R.M. 2386 (5th Cir. 1949); Bermite Powder Co.,
66 N.L.R.B. 678, 17 L.R.R.M. 348 (1946); Huntington Precision Prods., 65 N.L.R.B. 1439,
• 17 L.R.R.M. 293 (1946).
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where a night shift on which the claimant worked was eliminated
during the back pay period, he still obtained full back pay. Here the
evidence revealed that more machines of the type the claimant had
operated were used on the day shift than were formerly operated on
both the day and night shift combined."
In determining gross back pay the Board must be careful to
approximate as nearly as possible the employment situation which
the claimant would have been in absent the discrimination. In
carrying out this task the Board must draw a fine line between
various portions of an employer's operation, and between various
employee groups within the work force. The Board has held, for
example, that an employee unlawfully denied reemployment was not
entitled to back pay computed on the basis of what he would have
earned had he worked during the back pay period at one facility
where the discrimination against him occurred at another facility. 65
In other cases the Board has held that an employee reinstated to
his old job, but on a different shift, was entitled to the shift rate
differentia1. 66 In addition, earnings of independent hauling contrac-
tors may be used to compute the gross back pay of a driver where it
appears to be the most reasonable method of constructing the ex-
pectable economic life of the claimant during the back pay period. 67
In some cases the jobs of discriminatorily terminated employees
are later permanently abolished for nondiscriminatory reasons, such
as operational changes or automation. Such an occurrence tolls back
pay since the claimants would have been laid off even absent the
discrimination. However, if a job which has been abolished can be
traced to another job to which the claimant could reasonably have
expected to be transferred, back pay will not be tolled. 68
In computing gross back pay the Board normally takes into
account wage increases and other employment attributes that would
have benefited the claimant had he not been discharged or otherwise
discriminated against. For example, in Griffin Manufacturing Co., 69
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit enforced a Board order
directing respondent employer to pay quarterly, wage increases to
reinstated strikers who would have achieved the maximum pay
ceiling of their classification "but for" their absence during the
strike, even though the employer normally granted such increases on
64 Reynolds Int'l Pen Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 932, 18 L.R.R.M. 1425 (1946), enforcement
denied on other grounds, 162 F.2d 680, 20 L.R.R.M. 2321 (7th Cir. 1947).
65 Associated Truck Lines, Inc., 196 N.L.R.B. No. 36, 80 L.R.R.M. 1220 (1972). -
66
 Western Wirebound Box Co., 188 N.L.R.B. 164, 76 L.R.R.M. 1818 (1971).
67 Bowen Transp., 196 N.L.R.B. No. 100, 80 L.R.R.M. 1783 (1972).
68 Nibco, Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 277, 41 L.R.R.M. 1076 (1957).
69 Griffin Mfg. Co., 127 N.L.R.B. 417, 46 L.R.R.M. 1030 (1960), enforced, 410 F.2d
1161, 71 L,R.R.M. 2067 (5th Cir. 1969).
241
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
a merit basis. This approach represents another example of the
Board, with court approval,; constructing a fictional situation in
order to best effectuate a remedy based upon normal industrial
practice, and in the process resolving doubts against the respondent.
C. Deductions from Gross Back Pay
1. Illness During Back Pay Period
If an employee is ill during the back pay period and the em-
ployer has no sick leave program, compensation for this period has
been held to be deductible from gross back pay." Thus, back pay is
tolled during periods of pregnancy.'" On the other hand, where
there is a direct causal relationship between the claimant's illness
and the discrimination, back pay is not tolled. Thus, where a
claimant became ill during the back pay period because he was
allergic to the paint he was handling in his interim employment, the
Board awarded him full back pay during his eleven-month illness .
since he would not have been disabled but for the respondent's
discrimination against him. 72
In American Manufacturing Co.," the Board explicated its
position on the illness rule as follows:
The origins and causes of infections and organic
infirmities, such as influenza and heart attacks, for exam-
ple, are usually not known and cannot be determined or
assumed. It is ordinarily reasonable to assume, however,
that absences from work because of such illnesses would
probably have occurred even if the employee had not been'
discharged. As the claimant's loss therefore cannot be said
to have a likely relationship to the unlawful discrimination,
disallowance of back pay for all periods of unavailability
because of such illnesses is proper. Not only does this.
approach appear equitable in view of the impossibility of
reconstructing a possible cause, but it also affords simplic-
ity of administration in an area which would otherwise be
confused and difficult. 74
7° United States Air Conditioning Corp., 128 N.L.R.B. 117, 46 L.R.R.M. 1319 (1960);
Industrial Cotton Mills, 102 N.L.R.B. 1245, 31 L.R.R.M. 1387, modified and enforced, 208
F.2d 87, 33 L.R.R.M. 2158 (4th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 935 (1954); Niles Fire Brick
Co., 30 N.L.R.B. 426, 8 L.R.R.M. 61 (1941), enforced, 128 F.2d 258, 10 L.R.R.M. 642 (6th
Cir. 1942).
71 Happ Bros. Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 1513, 26 L.R.R.M. 1356 (1950), enforcement denied on
other grounds, 196 F.2d 195, 29 L.R.R.M. 2698 (5th Cir. 1952); Empire Worsted Mills, Inc.,
53 N.L.R.B. 683, 13 L.R.R.M. 123 (1943); California Walnut Growers Ass'n, 18 N.L.R.B.
493, 5 L.R.R.M. 419 (1934), modified mem., 7 L.R.R.M. 655 (9th Cir. 1941).
72 Charles T. Reynolds, 155 N.L.R.B. 384, 386, 60 L.R.R.M. 1343, 1344 (1965).
73 167 N.L.R.B. 520, 66 L.R.R.M. ,1122 (1967).
74 Id. at 522, 66 L.R.R.M. at 1125. .
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Then, modifying this per se approach, the Board noted that its
past practice of disallowing back pay without inquiry as to the
nature or cause of the disability was convenient but not always
equitable, and held that:
Where an interim disability is closely related to the nature
of the interim employment or arises from the unlawful
discharge and is not a usual incident of the hazards of
living generally, the period of disability will not be ex-
cluded from back pay. 75
In Hickman Garment Co., 76 for example, the Board held that
back pay due an unlawfully discharged employee would not be
reduced where intermittent absences during the back pay period did
not greatly exceed absences during the base period used in the
computation of back pay. In accordance with its obligation to estab-
lish deductions from back pay, 77
 the respondent bears the burden of
establishing that a period of illness has taken place. The burden
then shifts to the General Counsel to show the unusual nature of the
disability, its causes and its probable relation to the unlawful dis-
charge.
2. Interim Earnings
a. Elements of Interim Earnings
Interim earnings, the products of a claimant's fulfillment of his
duty to mitigate back pay, are deducted from gross back pay.
Generally, all income from employment is deducted as interim earn-
ings whether it results from steady employment or from the per-
formance of odd jobs. However, where a claimant is not credited
with gross back pay for varying periods because of lack of work at
respondent's plant, the seasonal nature of respondent's operation, or
the like, the tolling of gross back pay will also toll deduction of any
interim earnings for this period. 78
There are situations where employment-related income during
the back pay period is not deducted from gross back pay as interim
earnings. This includes income from "second jobs," strike benefits
and assistance, unemployment compensation, a part of workmen's
compensation awards, gifts, gratuities and legacies. This section will
consider each of these in turn.
Income from a second job which a claimant held during his
employment is not charged against him as interim earnings, since it
75 Id .
76 196 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 80 L.R.R.M. 1684 (1972), enforced, 471 F.2d 610, 82
L.R.R.M. 2540 (6th Cir. 1973).
77 See text at notes 190-206 infra.
78 San Juan Mercantile Corp., 135 N.L.R.B. 698, 49 L.R.R.M. 1549 (1962).
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results from work he would have performed in any event. 79 For
example, a claimant's earnings during the back pay period from a
home improvement business which he operated while in the employ
of respondent were held not 'to constitute interim earnings. 80 Of
course, if the claimant increases the hours and earnings in his second
job as a result of his forced unemployment, an amount equal to the
increase would constitute interim earnings deductible from gross
back pay. 81
Where strike benefits were paid to employees who were re-
quired to do some picketing as a condition of obtaining the benefits,
the Board held that the benefits paid were unrelated to the number
of hours devoted to picketing and were not included in interim
earnings since they represented collateral benefits flowing from the
claimants' association with their union and were not wages or
earnings. 82
Unemployment compensation payments are not regarded as
earnings and may not be charged against claimants as interim
earnings. 83
 Inasmuch as back pay constitutes wages," those claim-
ants who draw unemployment compensation during the back pay
period and who eventually receive back pay as a result of Board
proceedings have, in fact, been in receipt of "overpayments." Con-
sequently, some states require the claimants to return the compensa-
tion for those periods for which they were awarded back pay.
Income from public works relief projects do not constitute
interim earnings where they are in the nature of welfare payments or
are subject to repayment following the award of back pay." Neither
are Veterans Administration disability payments chargeable as in-
terim earnings. 86
79
 Belle Steel Co., 135 N.L.R.B. 1378, 49 L.R.R.M. 1719 (1962); Acme Mattress Co., 97
N.L.R.B. 1439, 29 L.R.R.M. 1247 (1952); Link-Belt Co., 12 N.L.R.B. 854, 4 L.R.R.M. 200
(1939), enforced in part, 110 F.2d 506, 6 L.R.R.M. 869 (7th Cir. 1940), rev'd as to those
portions not enforced, 311 U.S. 584 (1941); Louis Hornick Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 983, 1 L.R.R.M.
71 (1937).
8° Rice Lake Creamery Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 1113, 1114 n.4, 58 L.R.R.M. 1542 (1965).
81
 R.M. Johnson, 41 N.L.R.B. 263, 285, 10 L.R.R.M. 111 (1942).
" Lozano Enterprises, 152 N.L.R.B. 258, 59 L.R.R.M. 1076 (1965); Rice Lake Cream-
ery Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 1113, 58 L.R.R.M. 1542 (1965); Standard Printing Co., 151 N.L.R.B.
963, 58 L.R.R.M. 1540 (1965); Florence Printing Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 141, 54 L.R.R.M. 1325
(1963), enforced, 333 F.2d 289, 56 L.R.R.M. 2503 (4th Cir. 1964).
83
 NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361 (1957); NLRB v. Marshall Field & Co., 129
F.2d 169, 10 L.R.R.M. 753 (7th Cir. 1942), aff'd, 318 U.S. 253 (1943); Aerosonic Instrument
Corp., 128 N.L.R.B. 412, 46 L.R.R.M. 1337 (1960); Rockwood Stove Works, 63 N.L.R.B.
1297, 17 L.R.R.M. 58 (1945).
84 Social Security Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358 (1946).
85 See Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7 (1940); Vegetable Oil Prods. Co., 5
N.L.R.B. 52, 53, 1A L.R.R.M. 468 (1938).
88
 Burk Bros., 21 N.L.R.B. 1281, 6 L.R.R.M. 174 (1940), enforced, 117 F.2d 686, 7
L.R.R.M. 373 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 588 (1941).
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The Board does not toll back pay during a period of incapacity
due to an industrial accident on an interim job. 87
 There has been a
change of policy, however, respecting the qualification of workmen's
compensation awards as interim earnings deductible from gross
back pay. In American Manufacturing, the Board included as in-
terim earnings that portion of the award which represented partial
payment for loss of earnings." In so doing, the Board overruled its
decision in Melrose Processing Co.," where it had held that
workmen's compensation payments are not to be considered as
interim earnings. But in American Manufacturing the Board pointed
out that workmen's compensation awards consist of two
components—one being a payment for lost wages and the other
being reparation for physical damage suffered. 9° In order to avoid
double payment to a claimant, the Board now considers as interim
earnings that portion of the workmen's compensation award which
is reparation for lost wages but not that portion which compensates
the claimant for physical damages suffered and which is unrelated to
wages earned.
Where a claimant performs some work for another sporadically
and gratuitously during the back pay period and the other repays in
kind, the Board has generally held that the value of this work does
not constitute interim earnings. However, in some cases an ar-
rangement to perform such work in return for another's services
may constitute interim earnings even though neither party receives
cash for the work rendered. Such an arrangement must be estab-
lished convincingly and shown to amount to a firm mutual agree-
ment. No such agreement was found in a case where the claimant
occasionally lent a hand to his nephew on weekdays without hope or
expectation of compensation. The Board held that the value of these
services did not constitute interim earnings. 9 ' A legacy is not treated
as interim earnings. Thus, where during the back pay period a
claimant entered into a firm arrangement to take care of an elderly
man until he died in consideration of a legacy, the legacy was held
to be a gift and not interim earnings. However, the claimant was
considered to be off the labor market from the day she moved into
the legator's home to care for him and back pay was tolled from that
date
 until the legator died. 92
" Charles T. Reynolds, 155 N.L.R.B. 384, 60 L.R.R.M. 1343 (1965); Moss Planing Mill
Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 933, 35 L.R.R.M. 1165 (1954), set aside on other grounds, 224 F.2d 702,
36 L.R.R.M. 2534 (4th Cir. 1955).
88 167 N.L.R.B. 520, 66 L.R.R.M. 1122 (1967).
88 151 N.L.R.B. 1352, 58 L.R.R.M. 1638 (1965).
88 167 N.L.R.B. at 523, 66 L.R.R.M, at 1123.
91 Belle Steel Co., 135 N.L.R.B. 1378, 49 L.R.R.M. 1719 (1962), supplementing 131
N.L.R.B. 1083, 48 L.R.R.M. 1205 (1961).
92 Empire Worsted Mills, Inc., 53 N.L.R.B. 683, 693-95, 13 L.R.R,M. 123, 124 (1943).
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Another respondent claimed a setoff allowance based upon the
fact that a claimant paid a lesser amount for her meals while
employed at a hospital than she had paid while employed by re-
spondent. The Board rejected this claim, holding that the hospital
operated a cafeteria for its own, not the employee's, benefit and that
this benefit permitted the hospital to have the employee more acces-
sible to it. Further, respondent gave no consideration to the com-
parative quality of the meals involved. 93
There are benefits other than wages, however, which are con-
sidered to be interim earnings. For example, where an interim
employer furnished meals as part of the claimant's wages, the fair
value of such meals was added to interim earnings." Again, where
a claimant who unsuccessfully sought work after his discriminatory
discharge purchased a cafe and engaged in self-employment, the
Board added $50 per month to his interim earnings as the fair value
of the food which the claimant and his family consumed in their
cafe. 95
 Where a respondent gives a claimant severance pay at the
time of his discriminatory discharge, this amount does not constitute
interim earnings. 96
It sometimes happens, of course, that there is a discrepancy
between oral testimony concerning interim earnings and the avail-
able documentary evidence. The Board normally accepts Social
Security records as the best evidence of a claimant's interim earn-
ings, and gives such records a preferred evidentiary status vis-à-vis
contradictory oral testimony..In one case, the Board held Social
Security records to be controlling as to interim earnings where a
dischargee's testimony conflicted with the records; the Board also
refused to include as interim earnings amounts testified about which
did not appear in the Social Security records. 97
b. Expenses Deductible from Interim Earnings
During the course of the back pay period a claimant often
incurs out-of-pocket expenses which result directly from his loss of
employment and the fulfillment of his duty to mitigate back pay by
making a reasonable effort to find work. Claimants are generally
entitled to credit for such reasonable expenses, which are deductible
from interim earnings. The most common expense involves travel in
seeking work and travel to the new job.
93
 I. Posner, Inc., 154 N.L.R.B. 202; 214-15, 59 L.R.R.M. 1720 (1965).
" Empire Worsted Mills, Inc., 53 N.L.R.B. 683, 692, 13 L.R.R.M. 123, 124 (1943).
" W.C. Nabors, 134 N.L.R.B. 1078, 1099, 49 L.R.R.M. 1289 (1961).
96
 Press Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 630, 4 L.R.R.M. 333 (1939), modified and enforced, 118 F.2d
937, 7 L.R.R.M. 631 (D.C. Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 595 (1941).
" Associated Transp. Co., 194 N.L.R.B. 62, 78 L.R.R.M. 1678 (1971). See also Hick-
man Garment Co., 196 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 80 L.R.R.M. 1684 (1972), enforced, 471 F.2d 610,
82 L.R.R.M. 2540 (fith Cir. 1973).
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Thus, the Board allows expenses, such as mileage and other
travel expenses, where such travel is necessary to secure interim
employment as, for example, where claimants are forced to go to
other cities to obtain work. 98 Also, the estimated expense which a
claimant incurred in traveling to his interim employment in excess of
the sum he would have spent in traveling to respondent's plant is an
allowable expense. 99 Generally an employee's private automobile
expense is computed on a fixed-sum-per-mile basis. However, where
a claimant shares expenses with other claimants while traveling to
an interim job, or while seeking interim employment, such expenses
are computed on the basis of his out-of-pocket cost rather than on a
mileage basis. '°°
Union dues are not ordinarily an allowable item of expense,
even though the claimant incurred expenses for dues over and above
what he normally would have had to pay if he had continued in the
employ of respondent. '°' On the other hand, registration fees for the
use of a union hiring hall during the back pay period have been
recognized by the Board as an allowable expense.'°2 And where a
claimant was required to pay a union initiation fee as a condition of
his interim employment, this was held by the Board to constitute an
allowable deduction from interim earnings since it would not have
been incurred by the claimant but for the discrimination.'"
The expenses must be reasonable. Where a claimant made an
extended round trip of 1170 miles, purportedly in search of work,
the Board disallowed the expense of the trip, holding that it was not
reasonable for the claimant to travel such a distance, particularly
where he had no positive assurance that a job would be available for
him. 104 However, with respect to a discriminatee who accepted
interim employment 477 miles from his home, the Board allowed as
9g Charles T. Reynolds, 155 N.L,R,B. 384, 60 L.R.R.M. 1343 (1965); Morrison
Cafeterias Consol., Inc., 148 N.L.R.B, 139, 56 L R.R.M. 1483 (1964); Ampruf Paint Co., 132
N.L.R.B. 87, 48 L.R.R.M. 1323 (1961); Kohler Co., 128 N.L.R.B. 1062, 46 L.R.R.M. 1389
(1960), enforcement denied, 300 F,2d 699, 47 L.R.R.M. 2609 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 365
U.S. 869 (1961); Symns Grocer Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 346, 34 L.R.R,M. 1326 (1954); Climax
Spinning Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 1193, 31 L.R.R.M. 1206 (1952); Williams Lumber Co., 96
N.L.R.B. 635, 28 L.R.R.M. 1545 (1951), enforced, 195 F.2d 669, 29 L.R.R.M. 2633 (4th
Cir,), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 8.34 (1952); Pacific Mills Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 60, 26 L.R.R.M. 1453
(1950); Indianapolis Wire-Bound Box Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 617, 26 L.R.R.M. 1005 (1950);
Abbott Worsted Mills, Inc., 36 N.L.R.B. 545, 9 L.R.R.M. 163 (1941), enforced, 127 F,2d
438, 10 L.R.R.M. 590 (1st Cir. 1942).
99 West Texas Utils., Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 936, 34 L.R.R.M. 1476 (1954).
1 °° Rice Lake Creamery Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 1113, 1114, 58 L.R.R.M. 1542, 1548 (1965).
1 ° 1 Id.; West Texas Utils., Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 936, 34 L.R.R.M. 1476 (1954).
I" Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 892, 58 L.R.R.M. 1675 (1965); NLRB
v. Houston Maritime Ass'n, 337 F.2d 333, 57 L.R.R.M. 2170 (5th Cir. 1964).
10 Rice Lake Creamery Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 1113, 1114, 58 L.R.R.M. 1542, 1548 (1965),
enforced in part, 365 F.2d 888, 62 L.R.R.M. 2332 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
104 W.C. Nabors, 134 N.L.R.B. 1078, 1098, 49 L.R.R.M. 1289 (1961).
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an expense deductible from his interim earnings fifty dollars per
week for room and board, and travel expenses for one round trip to
his home during the four-week back pay period.'"
The Board draws a distinction between expenses directly at-
tributable to a search for interim employment and other losses or
damages incidental to the discrimination. For example, where a
claimant suffered a $200 loss on recently purchased furniture which
she had to sell in order to accept a job in another state, the Board
refused to allow such loss as a deductible expense.'" Also dis-
allowed as expenses are foreclosures on houses, automobiles, ap-
pliances and the like, resulting from a claimant's inability to main-
tain installment payments during the back pay period.'"
Although a claimant is entitled to the difference between his net
earnings, if any, from self-employment and his gross back pay, the
Board holds that he is not entitled to back pay for any losses he
incurs in self-employment.' 08
3. Willful Loss of Earnings
Since the Phelps Dodge 109 decision, both the Board and the
courts have agreed that discriminatees have a duty to mitigate back
pay. This duty requires only an honest, good faith effort to obtain
interim employment, in which success is not the measure of the
sufficiency of the search."° Some commentators would describe the
obligation of a discriminatee in other terms. For example, Corbin
says:
It is not infrequently said that it is the "duty" of the
injured party to mitigate his damages so far as that can be
done by reasonable effort on his part. Since there is no
judicial penalty, however, for his failure to make this
effort, it is not desirable to say that he is under a "duty."
His recovery against the defendant will be exactly the same
whether he makes the effort and mitigates his loss, or not;
but if he fails to make the reasonable effort, with the result
that his injury is greater than it would otherwise have
been, he cannot recover judgment for the amount of this
avoidable and unnecessary increase. The law does not
1 ° 5
 Southern Household Prods. Co., 203 N.L.R.B. No. 138, 83 L.R.R.M. 1247 (1973).
'" Empire Worsted Mills, Inc., 53 N.L.R.B. 683, 693-94, 13 L.R.R.M. 123, 124 (1943).
107
 Moss Planing Mill Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 933, 35 L.R.R.M. 1165 (1954), set aside on
other grounds, 224 F.2d 702, 36 L.R.R.M. 2534 (4th Cir. 1955).
IN English Mica Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 1061, 31 L.R.R.M. 1177 (1952).
1 °9
 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
"O East Texas Steel Castings Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 1336, 38 L.R.R.M. 1470 (1956);
Cashman Auto Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 720, 34 L.R.R.M. 1429 (1954), enforced, 223 F.2d 832,
836, 36 L.R.R.M. 2269, 2271-72 (1st Cir. 1955).
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penalize his inaction; it merely does nothing to compensate
him for the loss that he helped to cause by not avoiding
it.'"
As the efforts by different claimants in their quest for em-
ployment present widely varying factual situations, it is manifest
that the Board cannot lay down a single standard which will fit the
circumstances of every case. The trial examiner in Mastro Plastics
Corp., 112 a leading case, noted:
But it can be said that in broad terms a good-faith effort
requires conduct consistent with an inclination to work and
to be self-supporting and that such inclination is best evi-
denced not by a purely mechanical examination of the
number or kind of applications for work which have been
made, but rather by the sincerity and reasonableness of the
efforts made by an individual in his circumstances to re-
lieve his unemployment. Circumstances include the
economic climate in which the individual operates, his skill
and qualifications, his age, and his personal limitations." 3
The law relating to willful loss generally involves the adequacy
of the search, the suitability of the job, the quitting of interim
employment and the claimant's venture into self-employment during
the back pay period.
a. Adequacy of the Search for Work
In Southern Silk Mills, Inc.,'" the Board ruled that the obliga-
tion of the discriminatee is satisfied if he makes a reasonable effort
to find new employment substantially equivalent to the position
from which he was discharged and suitable to a person of his
background and experience. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
refused to enforce the Board's order, holding that after a reasonable
time the claimant must lower his sights. The court explained that:
We are of the opinion, however, that the usual wage
earner, reasonably conscious of the obligation to support
himself and his family by suitable employment, after ina-
bility over a reasonable period of time to obtain the kind of
employment to which he is accustomed, would consider
"I 5 A. Corbin, Contracts
	 1039, at 242-43 (1964).
112
 136 N.L.R.B. 1342, 31 L.R.R.M. 1494 (1953), enforced in part, 354 F.2d 170, 60
L,R.R.M. 2578 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 972 (1966).
136 N.L.R.B. at 1359.
114
 116 N.L.R.B. 769, 38 L,R.R.M. 1317 (1956), enforcement denied, 242 F.2d 697, 39
L,R.R.M. 2647 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 871 (1957).
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other available, suitable employment at a somewhat lower
rate of pay "desirable new employment." 15
Here the court ruled that the employees, discharged textile workers,
should have accepted jobs in the retail trade or in a freezing and
preserving plant.
Other appellate courts have, on occasion, disagreed with the
Board. In one case, for example, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed the Board and held that an employee's insistence on
waiting for a position in the same company amounted to a willful
refusal to accept equivalent employment. 16 The Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit held in another case" 7 that the Board had
erred in holding that discharged sawmill workers did not have to
accept agricultural jobs in the area. On remand, the Board noted
that the court had not said that a claimant had to lower his sights
immediately after discharge but only after a reasonable time, leaving
it up to the Board to decide what period was reasonable; the Board
found a three-month period to be reasonable and the court affirmed
on appea1. 118
 In complying with this rule, the claimant must walk a
tightrope since, paradoxically, if he accepts a lower paying job too
quickly, respondent employer may seek to disqualify him from re-
ceiving back pay by contending that he willfully incurred losses by
not persisting in his search for more lucrative employment. This was
the argument of the respondent in J.H. Rutter-Rex Manufacturing
Co.," 9 where plastic factory employees, unable to find factory
work, took jobs as domestics. The Board found that because of their
lack of education and training these claimants had not engaged in an
unjustifiable refusal to seek desirable interim employment, and the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit enforced the Board's order
with some modifications. Respondents raised the same defense, al-
beit without success, in East Texas Steel Castings Co. ,120 where a
welder accepted a job as a taxicab driver, and in Moss Planing Mill
Co.,"' where a fireman sought and found work as an agricultural
worker.
The Board recognizes that a claimant may not be able to secure
115
 242 F.2d at 700, 39 L.R.R.M. at 2649.
16
 NLRB v. Alaska S.S. Co., 211 F.2d 357, 33 L.R.R.M. 2636 (9th Cir. 1954).
112
 NLRB v. Moss Planing Mill Co., 224 F.2d 702, 36 L.R.R.M. 2534 (4th Cir. 1955).
i's Moss Planing Mill Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 1733, 41 L.R.R.M. 1381, enforced, 256 F.2d
653, 42 L.R.R.M. 2393 (4th Cir. 1958).
115
 158 N.L.R.B. 1414, 62 L.R.R.M. 1456 (1966), enforcement denied in part and
granted in part, 399 F.2d 356, 68 L.R.R.M. 2916 (5th Cir. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 396
U.S. 258 (1969).
120
 116 N.L.R.B. 1336, 1357, 38 L.R.R.M. 1470, 1472-73 (1956).
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interim employment immediately following his unlawful termina-
tion, and thus exercises some latitude in allowing such an individual
to commence his search for work in an orderly fashion. This ap-
proach of the Board constitutes in effect a moderating factor con-
cerning the claimant's obligation to mitigate damages. In one recent
case where it applied this principle, the Board held that an employee
was entitled to back pay for a two-week period immediately follow-
ing his discriminatory layoff despite a claim that he did not seek new
employment during that period. 122
The difficult issue in every case is whether a claimant's effort to
find work is reasonable. In Seamprufe, Inc., 123 the Board found that
the claimant garment worker was discharged on January 3, 1948,
and was offered reinstatement by respondent almost four years later
on November 31, 1951. She failed to register with the United States
Employment Service and did not obtain any employment during this
period. She made her first application for work on June 15, 1948, to
the only garment factory other than respondent's in McAllister, a
town with a population of 12,000. She was told that she would be
called if needed and that this factory already had a long waiting list
of applicants. There were in McAllister some 22 manufacturing
plants, which in 1947 employed a total of 341 employees. At that
time, the garment factory to which she applied had only 11 em-
ployees on its payroll. She then applied unsuccessfully at the tele-
phone company. Her next attempt was a year later in August 1949,
at which time she again applied, without success, at the same
garment factory. Then, in October 1950, she applied for a position
as a nurse's aide at the McAllister Hospital and was told that she
would have to take a training course without pay and that, even
then, there was no assurance that she would be employed. In July
1951, she applied at the garment factory for the third time with
unfavorable results. By this time, the garment factory had only six
employees. A majority of the Board first found that, since the
claimant did not seek work from January 3, 1948, to June 15, 1948,
she was not entitled to back pay for that period. However, from that
date she waited a year before seeking work. Because of the limited
opportunities available, the Board held that she could not be ex-
pected to make a daily canvas of business establishments absent
some evidence that such a search would prove fruitful. The Board
majority also held, however, that she should have made efforts at
least every six months and, accordingly, awarded her back pay for a
period of six months from the date on which she made a search for
work. Member Peterson dissented, pointing out that the claimant
122
 Saginaw Aggregates, Inc., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 78, 81 L.R.R.M. 1025 (1972).
123
 103 N.L.R.B. 763, 31 L.R.R.M. 1566 (1953).
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had not only failed to register with the Employment Service but had
only applied at four different establishments in 46 months. This did
not, in his opinion, constitute a reasonable search. He observed that
during this period she had no income other than her husband's, that
she was not a skilled worker, and that there was no showing that
employment opportunities were limited in the vicinity in which she
lived.
On reconsideration,' 24
 the Board reversed itself and
disqualified the claimant entirely, holding that although she may
have been justified in not reapplying for the hospital job because of
her lack of training in that field, no reason appeared why she could
not have reapplied at the telephone company, applied at a local
laundry, or made other applications elsewhere during the lengthy
back pay period. The Board observed that employees may be
awarded back pay only during periods when they are "on the labor
market."
In another case, a garment worker went to nursing school
during the back pay period, ultimately qualifying as a nurse. The
Board held that no back pay was due while she was attending
school. It also concluded that she had removed herself from the
sewing labor market upon completion of her training and had thus
cut off back pay. 125
 Another garment worker became an apprentice
bricklayer during his back pay period. The Board held that he
remained on the labor market and was eligible for back pay until he
became a journeyman bricklayer and ceased seeking other em-
ployment, at which point he was held to have abandoned the
garment industry and his back pay was cut off.' 26
A claimant was self-employed in sewing work at her home,
averaging about $10 a week. She did this to support her children.
The Board found that she was unable to earn more money during
this period because she preferred to stay at home and care for her
children. Thus, the Board found a partial loss and concluded that
her gross back pay should be computed on the basis of two days a
week at respondent's plant. The money she earned in sewing was
deducted from this amount as interim earnings. The respondent's
contention that she would not have returned to the plant during this
period was rejected since full employment with respondent would
have enabled her to afford a baby sitter.' 27
One claimant had virtually no earnings over a two-year period
and yet the Board found no willful loss of earnings under the special
124 Seamprufe, Inc., 106 N.L.R.B. 1143, 32 L.R.R.M, 1630 (1953).
' 25 J.H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 1414, 1420, 62 L.R.R.M. 1456 (1966).
126 158 N.L.R.B. at 1419-20.
127 Id. at 1422, 62 L.R.R.M. at 1457,
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circumstances which existed. The claimant was a 59 year-old
woman who had worked for respondent for more than twelve years
before her discharge. She sought work and answered advertisements
for domestic work, but was rejected because of her age and lack of
experience as a domestic. The Board found that she was inclined to
work and the fact that she was not successful did not bar her back
pay claim.ug
In Harvest Queen Mill & Elevator Co. ,' 29 an employee failed to
register with the Employment Service after his August 7, 1947,
discharge, and did not make a serious effort to secure employment
in his home town. He drove to Amarillo, Texas, where he was
offered a job in the Fire Department at $140 a month. He refused
the job as it would have meant moving to Amarillo and he consid-
ered the pay inadequate. He then went to Fort Worth, Texas, and
unsuccessfully applied at only one mining company. On September
20, 1947, he obtained a job at a concern where the work was
sporadic, leaving that position on April 1, 1948. He then went to
work as a tractor operator until July 17, 1948. The trial examiner,
with Board approval, concluded that the claimant had not made a
serious effort to find work from August 7, 1947, through July 17,
1948. He characterized. the claimant's trips to Amarillo and Fort
Worth as "junkets" and disallowed his claim for expenses for these
trips.' 3 ° With respect to the job at which work was spasmodic he
concluded that the claimant could have found work during the time
he was idle, and noted that during this period the claimant had only
earned $300, or about $54 per month.
Another claimant failed to seek work in his own home town.
Instead he made a round trip of 1170 miles, purportedly seeking
employment. He then moved some distance from his home state of
Louisiana to Arkansas, where his wife's mother had a vacant house.
He sought work there, but no jobs were available. He did look for
work in a town thirty miles away. The trial examiner found that the
claimant's primary reason for moving to Arkansas was to enable his
wife to be near her aged mother and that the claimant had not made
a good faith, diligent effort to seek gainful employment. Accord-
ingly, the claimant was denied back pay for this period of time.I 31
A garment worker, following a period during which she was off
the labor market due to pregnancy, worked at home doing ironing
and earned $7 a week. Since she made no other search for work the
Board deemed the self-employment insufficient and denied her back
US 158 N.L.R.B. at 1450.
129 90 N.L.R.B. 320, 26 L.R.R.M. 1189 (1950).
130 Id. at 332-34, 26 L.R.R.M. at 1190-91.
131 W.C. Nabors, 134 N.L.R.B. 1078, 1098, 49 L.R.R.M. 1289 (1961).
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pay for this period. 132 Another claimant who held various jobs
during the back pay period accepted work for a time as a baby
sitter, working about twenty-five hours a week. This was held not to
constitute a willful loss of earnings.' 33
A claimant who had been employed as a garment worker
worked as a maid two days a week during the back pay period. The
Board held that she incurred a partial loss by not seeking work for
at least five days a week and awarded her only forty percent of her
quarterly back pay. On the other hand, another garment worker
attempted unsuccessfully to obtain work in that industry and finally
accepted housework from two to five days a week. She testified
credibly that she was not satisfied with what she earned but "was
picking what she could get at the time." Here the Board found no
willful loss, holding that under the circumstances it was reasonable
for her to lower her sights to housework after she was unable to find
any work in the garment factories and by so doing mitigating her
back pay amount rather than Incurring a willful loss of earnings. 134
Thus, it may be said that it is the adequacy of the search and the
state of mind of the claimant which governs the question whether he
has incurred a willful loss. The fact that he remains unemployed for
an extended period is not conclusive, although it may be evidence of
the inadequacy of his search.
The Board is not quick to draw the conclusion that an unlaw-
fully terminated employee has demonstrated a disinclination to seek
or obtain gainful employment. Where, for example, the evidence at
a back pay hearing showed that the claimant had rejected interim
employment with another company more than fifty miles away from
his home, the Board held that such rejection was reasonable under
the circumstances and did not,charge the claimant with a willful loss
during the period of time following such rejection. 135
 In another
case a court of appeals enforced the Board's back pay order despite
the employer's contention that many discharged employees had
moved to less industrialized areas. The court held that such
generalizations that employees did not want to work could not prove
that specific back pay claimants had incurred willful loss of
earnings.' 36
132 J.H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 158 'N.L.R.B. 1414, 1454, 62 L.R.R.M. 1456 (1966).
133
 158 N.L.R.B. at 1488.
L34 Id. at 1455, 1467.
' 35 Madison Courier, Inc., 180 N.L.R.B. 781, 76 L.R.R.M. 1802 (1970), affirmed in
part, 460 F.2d 1240, 80 L.R.R.M. 3377, (D.C. Cir. 1972).
136 Reynolds Box Co., 155 N.L.R.B, 389, 60 L.R.R.M. 1343, enforced, 399 F.2d 668, 68
L.R.R.M. 2974 (6th Cir. 1968).
254
BACK PAY REVISITED
b. Quitting an Interim Job
Another type of willful loss may occur when claimants quit
interim jobs. In Mastro Plastics Corp.," 7 the Board held that a
claimant who willfully incurs losses by either quitting or refusing
substantially equivalent employment is not deprived of his entire
claim, but only so much of it as he would have earned had he
retained or obtained that interim job. Thus, in Knickerbocker Plas-
tic Co., 138 claimants had obtained employment which the Board
found was not inconvenient, distasteful or malodorous. Since the
jobs were not unsuitable the claimants were not justified in quitting
them. Thus, from the date they quit and for the balance of the back
pay period, each of the claimants was deemed to have earned the
hourly wage being earned at the time the quitting occurred. This
was offset as interim earnings from gross back pay. Should the
claimants have secured other positions thereafter and earned more
than the offset, the actual amount of interim earnings rather than
the lesser amount would have been deducted from gross back pay.
On the other hand, it has long been established that a dis-
criminatee is not required to mitigate his damages by continuing in a
job which is dangerous to life or limb or which is not "suitable." 139
Where a claimant quit an interim job after three or four weeks
because he was required to work alone on a machine which cus-
tomarily required two men and thus feared an injury while no one
would be in attendance, the quitting was found to be for good
cause.'" In another case, a claimant quit his interim employment
because he had been switched from the day to the night shift and the
lighting was poor. Rather than endanger his eyesight, he quit and
attempted, unsuccessfully, to operate a gas station which he had
leased. The Board, reversing the trial examiner, ruled that his
departure did not constitute a willful loss since he was not obligated
to work under dangerous conditions."'
When claimants undertake to do more than is required in
seeking employment, they may disqualify themselves. Thus in Ozark
Hardwood Co., 142 four employees left the state and found interim
employment which was substantially equivalent to the jobs from
137 136 N.L.R.B. 1342, 50 L.R.R.M. 1006 (1962).
138 132 N.L.R.B. 1209, 1215, 48 L.R.R.M. 1505, 1507 (1961).
139 Mastro Plastics Corp., 136 N.L.R.B. 1342, 50 L.R.R.M. 1006 (1962); Columbia
Pictures Corp., 82 N.L.R.B. 568, 23 L.R.R.M. 1615 (1949).
'" J.H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 1414, 62 L.R.R.M. 1456 (1966).
141 L.B. Hosiery Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 630, 30 L.R.R.M. 1115 (1952).
' 42 119 N.L.R.B. 1130, 41 L.R.R.M. 1243 (1957), enforced in part, 282 F.2d I, 46
L.R.R.M. 2823 (8th Cir. 1960).
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which they had been discharged. They then quit to return home.
The Board held that, although they had no obligation to leave the
state to find jobs, once having done so and having found substan-
tially equivalent work, to quit was to incur willful loss of earnings.
Thus back pay was cut off at the time of the quitting. So, too, in
American Bottling Co., 143 a claimant left Corpus Christi, Texas,
and went to Chicago, where he found a job paying higher wages
than he had received from the respondent. After returning for the
hearing before the Board on a thirty-day leave of absence, he spent
time with his father who had been taken ill. Instead of returning to
Chicago, he accepted lower paying interim jobs. Then he returned
to Chicago to his higher paying job, from which he was discharged
because of excessive absenteeism. Thereafter, he secured other lower
paying jobs. The Board cut off back pay as of the day he first
secured the higher paying job in Chicago, holding that he incurred
willful losses by not maintaining this position.
Where an employee quits, without good cause, a higher paying
job for a lower paying one in the same area, the monetary difference
between the two will be deducted from the gross back pay. Thus, in
one case,'" the claimant quit an interim job and accepted a position
as a trainee in the electronics field, paying $20 less per week. As a
trainee he also received $20 per week from the Government under
the G.I. Training Bill in addition to his wages. Nevertheless, the
Board held that by taking a job at $20 per week less than he had
received, he had incurred willful loss to the extent of $20 per week.
A claimant who quit her job after an unfair labor practice strike
had ended and applied for reinstatement was told by respondent
that there were no vacancies. She attempted to return to her interim
job but found that it had been filled. The Board held that she had
not incurred willful loss of earnings and awarded her back pay for
this period. 145
C. Self-Employment
It is well established that bona fide self-employment will be
regarded as compliance with the obligation imposed upon a dis-
charged employee to use reasonable diligence to keep himself in
gainful employment and thus discharge his obligation of minimizing
or mitigating his damages.' 46 In NLRB v. Armstrong Tire & Rubber
Co., " 7 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that an employee's
143 116 N.L.R.B. 1303, 38 L.R.R.M. 1465 (1956).
144
 Somerville Cream Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 1155, 32 L.R.R.M. 1638 (1953).
145 J.H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 1414, 1494, 62 L.R.R.M. 1456 (1966).
146
 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
147 263 F.2d 680, 43 L.R.R.M. 2577, motion for leave to file petition for rehearing
denied, 265 F.2d 212, 44 L.R.R.M. 2203 (5th Cir. 1959).
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part-time work in his wife's ice-house was not, in fact, bona fide
self-employment. On the other hand, in Nabors v. NLRB,'" the
court held that the claimant had engaged in bona fide self-
employment when he leased and operated a gasoline station.
Another claimant was held to be so engaged when he operated a
farm,' 49 Also qualifying was the operation of a taxi business by a
57 year-old man for whom opportunities for obtaining interim em-
ployment were limited.'"
The Board has also held that it is "reasonable to assume absent
special circumstances, that a person who leaves a job for self-
employment expects to improve his financial position" rather than
incur a willful loss."' In Cashman Auto Co., " 2 for example, two
employees sought work without success and then opened a small
private auto repair business which was also financially unsuccessful
during a large portion of the back pay period. They continued to
seek employment while operating their private business. It was held
that where, as here, the claimants made an earnest and continuous
attempt to find jobs, would have returned to respondent's employ
had they been asked at any time during this period, and started and
continued their own business in the hope of making a profit, they
incurred no willful losses. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
observed that the most that can be said about these employees
is that their judgment was poor in not putting in full time
at their repair shop, or that their managerial and book-
keeping skills were so undeveloped that it was poor judg-
ment for them to have undertaken their business venture at
9.11)53
The court concluded that "the principle of mitigation of damages
does not require success; it only requires an honest good faith effort,
and the Board found on ample evidence that both men made such
an effort." 154
In other cases, the Board, with the approval of the courts of
appeals, has likewise held that mere lack of success in self-
employment des not in and of itself disqualify a back pay claimant.
For example, in one case, the Board disregarded the statement of a
Ha 323 F.2d 686, 52 L.R.R.M. 2259 (5th Cir. 1963).
149 Cashman Auto Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 720, 34 L.R.R.M. 1429 (1954), enforced, 223 F.2d
832, 36 L.R.R.M. 2269 (1st Cir. 1955).
' 5° Greenville Steel Car Co., 54 N.L.R.B. 608, 13 L.R.R.M. 179 (1944),
151 Harvest Queen Mill & Elevator Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 320, 26 L.R.R.M. 1189 (1950).
152 109 N.L.R.B. 720, 34 L.R.R.M. 1429 (1954), enforced, 223 F.2d 832, 36 L.R.R.M.
2269 (1st Cir. 1955).
153 223 F.2d 832, 836, 36 L.R.R.M. 2269, 2272 (1st Cir. 1955).
' 54 id.
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self-employed individual that he did not desire reinstatement on the
ground that it was irrelevant to the issues of willful loss of earnings
and adequacy of post-discharge efforts to mitigate damages.'"
D. Mathematical Computation
1. Quarterly Computations
During its first fifteen years, the Board applied the back pay
formula' 56
 in its elementary form, calculating back pay on the basis
of the entire period between the unlawful discharge and the
employer's offer of reinstatement. 157
 Its experience over these years,
however, indicated to the Board that in some cases the application
of the back pay formula in its elementary form created an an-
tagonism between the companion remedies of back pay and rein-
statement. The Board observed that the application of the basic
formula tended to discourage employers from offering reinstatement
in cases where discriminatees had suffered lengthy periods of unem-
ployment following their discriminatory discharges and had then
obtained employment at a wage rate exceeding that which they had
obtained in their original employment. In such situations the result
was progressive reduction or complete liquidation of the back pay
liability. Thus, the opportunity was presented for an employer de-
liberately to refrain from offering reinstatement, knowing that delay
would progressively reduce his back pay liability. The dis-
criminatee, for his part, was under pressure to react to such a tactic
by waiving his right to reinstatement, thus tolling the running of
back pay liability and preserving the amount then owing.
In 1950 the Board refined the formula in its decision in F.W.
Woolworth Co. 158 by compartmentalizing back pay calculations into
separate calendar quarters. The Board held that "the loss of pay
[shall] be computed on the basis of each separate calendar quarter or
portion thereof during the period from the Respondent's dis-
criminatory action to the date of a proper offer of reinstatement"
and the lelarnings in one particular quarter shall have no effect
upon the back pay liability for any other quarter. " 159
Some commentators denounced the Board's Woolworth formula
as an unwarranted departure from the common law principles of
155 Heinrich Motors Inc., 166 N.L.R.B. 783, 65 L.R.R.M. 1668, enforced, 403 F.2d
145, 69 L.R.R.M. 2613 (2d Cir. 1969).
1 " See text at notes 5-6 supra.
157 The formula was applied this way in the Board's first case. Pennsylvania Greyhound
Lines, Inc., 1 N.L.R.B. I, I L.R.R.M. 303 (1935), enforced in part, 91 F.2d 178, 1 L.R.R.M.
629 (3d Cir. 1937), rev'd and remanded for enforcement, 303 U.S. 261 (1938).
158 90 N.L.R.B. 289, 26 L.R.R.M. 1185 (1950).
1S9 Id. at 292-93, 26 L.R.R.M. at 1185-86,
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mitigation of damages, arguing that delimitation of monetary dam-
ages into quarterly sectors removed the back pay liability from the
realm of the purely remedial and invested it with a punitive aspect.
The Supreme Court, however, in NLRB v. Seven- Up Bottling
Co.,"° endorsed the Board's Woolworth formula, reversing a con-
trary decision of the Fifth Circuit. Declining to enter the "bog of
logomachy" as to what is remedial and what is punitive, the Su-
preme Court concluded that the Woolworth formula does bear ap-
propriate relation to the policies of the Act and accordingly enforced
the order of the Board."' In doing so, the Court deferred to the
experience of the Board, and stated that a back pay order of the
Board "should stand unless it can be shown that the order is a
patent attempt to ahieve ends other that those which can fairly be
said to effectuate the policies of the Act."' 62
While some commentators have argued that the Woolworth
formula imposes a punitive sanction upon the employer by disallow-
ing earnings in one quarter for mitigation of damages in another,
others have pointed out that the mechanical and inflexible approach
of the formula can also work a hardship upon the discriminatee by
disallowing expenses incurred in seeking interim employment as a
set-off against the earnings from such employment. Consider, for
example, the case of an employee earning $120 per week who is
unlawfully discharged at the end of February, spends $300 to find
interim employment requiring relocation of his family, and starts his
new job at $100 per week during the last week in March. His back
pay figures for the first quarter will appear as follows:
Net Back Pay = Gross Back Pay — (Interim Earnings = Expenses)
$480	 $480	 $100	 $300
(4 weeks at $120)	 (1 week at $100)
In this computation the $300 of expenses will simply serve to
extinguish the $100 deduction for interim earnings. The net back
pay, then, will be the same as the gross, $480, and the claimant will
be left uncompensated for the remaining $200 of expenses. Assum-
ing that he continues the same employment during the second quar-
ter, his back pay figures for that quarter will appear as follows:
Net Back Pay = Gross Back Pay — (Interim Earnings — Expenses)
$260	 $1,560	 $1,300	 0
(13 weeks at $120) 	 (13 weeks at $100)
1 " 344 U.S. 344 (1953), rev'g 196 F.2d 424, 30 L.R.R.M. 2036 (5th Cir. 1952).
161 344 U.S. at 348.
162 Id. at 346-47, quoting Virginia Eiec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 540
(1943).
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Although he has sufficient interim earnings in this quarter from
which his expenses could be set off, he will not be allowed to carry
over the expenses unaccounted for in the first quarter and will
remain uncompensated to the extent of $200. Thus it can be seen
that there are factual situations, albeit relatively uncommon, in
which the principle of separate quarterly computations can act to
the disadvantage of the back pay claimant.
2. Interest on Back Pay Awards.
In 1962, in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., ' 63 the Board first
awarded interest on back pay. In Isis the Board observed that back
pay is an indebtedness arising out of an obligation imposed by a
statute governing the employer-employee relationship, and is thus a
quasi-contractual liability rather than a fine or penalty. Acknowl-
edging that its decision represented a departure from precedent, the
Board nevertheless noted that the principle that a wrongdoer should
pay interest on an amount wrongfully withheld "is not a revolu-
tionary pronouncement."'" The Board held that the interest would
be computed at the rate of six percent per annum and, conforming
to the Woolworth formula, would accrue on the last day of each
calendar quarter on the amount then due for each quarterly period
and would continue until compliance with the Board's order. The
Board's policy of awarding interest has received approval from the
courts of appeals.' 65
In 1970 the Board rejected attempts to extend the Isis doctrine
by increasing the rate of interest and by building in additional
factors designed to recognize the impact of an inflationary economy.
In B & G Chrysler-Plymouth, 166
 the Board refused to increase the
interest on back pay awards from six percent to nine percent or to
augment the back pay award with a cost of living adjustment
designed to reflect the decline in the value of the dollar since the
unlawful discharges. A short time later the Board rejected a similar
attempt to increase the interest on back pay awards from six percent
to eight Tercent. 167
3. The End of the Back Pay Period
In addition to adding interest to back pay in 1962, the Board
departed from precedent and strengthened its back pay remedy in
163 138 N.L.R.B. 716, 51 L.R.R.M. 1122 (1962), enforcement denied on other grounds,
322 F.2d 913, 54 L.R.R.M. 2235 (9th Cir. 1963).
164 138 N.L.R.B. at 718, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1123.
165
 Marshfield Steel Co. v. NLRB, 324 F.2d 333, 54 L.R.R.M. 2648 (8th Cir. 1963);
Operative Potters v. NLRB, 320 F.2d 757, 53 L.R.R.M. 2489 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Reserve
Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 317 F.2d 785, 53 L.R.R.M. 2374 (2d Cir. 1963).
166 186 N.L.R.B. 282, 75 L.R.R.M. 1370 ( 1 970).
167 National Cash Register Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 581, 77 L.R.R.M. 1342 (1971).
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another respect. Prior to 1962 the Board, in cases where it found a
discriminatory discharge following a contrary conclusion by a trial
examiner, had tolled back pay as of the date of the trial examiner's
decision and excluded from the computation of back pay the period
between the issuance of such decision and the date of the Board
order.'" The rationale underlying the tolling practice was that, in
the event of a finding by a trial examiner that the discharge was not
unlawful, the employer could not have been expected to reinstate
the dischargee on the basis of the trial examiner's decision. In its
1962 decision in A.P.W. Products Co., 169 the Board rejected this
reasoning and abandoned its tolling practice on the ground that it
benefited the wrongdoer at the expense of the wronged. Since then
the Board has awarded back pay for the full period from the date of
the discrimination to the date of an offer of reinstatement or other
cutoff date found appropriate in the particular case regardless of the
nature of the trial examiner's findings and recommendation.
Although it has reversed its historical practice of tolling back
pay in cases involving discriminatory discharges and other termina-
tions under section 8(a)(3) of the Act, the Board has not completely
abandoned the tolling concept. On the contrary, the Board has
continued to utilize the device in special circumstances which it feels
warrant the application of an equitable rather than a mechanistic
approach. During the two years following its A.P.W. decision, the
Board tolled back pay in three cases. In Fibreboard Paper Products
Corp.,'" the Board tolled back pay at the time of the trial
examiner's decision where employees were terminated as a result of
unlawful subcontracting. The Board's rationale rested upon the fact
that the existence of the duty to bargain over the decision to subcon-
tract was unsettled in Board law at the time the employer awarded
the subcontract and that, consequently, the employer could not
reasonably be expected to offer reinstatement prior to a final order of
the Board. In Kohler Co.,'" the Board again tolled back pay in a
case where strikers were denied reinstatement because of unpro-
tected acts of misconduct. The Board found for the employer in its
original decision but later reversed itself upon remand from the
court of appeals. In view of the employer's belated apprisal of the
legal principles to be applied, the Board considered it appropriate to
consider the equities favoring the employer in fixing the back pay
"a R.E. Smith, 131 N.L.R.B. 513, 48 L.R.R.M. 1093 (1961); Time-O-Matic, Inc., 121
N.L.R.B. 179, 42 L.R.R.M. 1316 (1958).
1 " 137 N.L.R.B. 25, 50 L.R.R.M. 1042 (1962), enforced, 316 F.2d 899 (2d Cir, 1963).
17° 138 N.L.R.B. 550, 51 L.R.R.M. 1101 (1962), enforced, 322 F,2d 411, 53 L.R.R.M.
2666 (D.C. Cir. 1963), afFd, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
171 148 N.L.R.B. 1434, 57 L.R.R.M. 1148 (1964), enforced, 345 F.2d 748, 58 L.R.R.M.
2847 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 836 (1965).
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period. The third case, Walls Manufacturing Co., 172 involved sub-
stantially the same equitable considerations as in Kohler.
In February 1966, the District of Columbia Circuit called upon
the Board to explicate clearly its post-A.P.W. tolling practice and to
develop minimal standards respecting such practice.' 73 Complying
with the mandate of the court, the Board indicated, in its second
supplemental decision in Ferrell-Hicks Chevrolet, Inc., ' 74 that back
pay will not be tolled in section 8(a)(3) cases involving discrimina-
tory motive (even where a trial examiner erroneously concluded that
the employer's conduct was lawful), but that the tolling device will
be reserved for those infrequent cases where (1) the unlawful termi-
nation is free of mala fides intent, and (2) the employer is justifiably
reliant on a decisional error or on an expectation that the Board
would adhere to a particular view of the law. Thus the Board made
it clear that it now considers the tolling device an extraordinary
measure to be utilized only where the equities in a case weigh
strongly in favor of the employer. The Board has also held that such
equities did not exist simply because the General Counsel experi-
enced a year's delay in issuing a complaint after the filing of a
charge, and thus refused to toll back pay for strikers refused rein-
statement until the date on which the complaint was issued. 15
IV. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF BACK PAY
A. Practice and Procedure
At every stage of a Board proceeding from the time that a
complaint has been authorized by the general counsel, every effort is
made to settle the case without resort to litigation. In this connec-
tion, the Board holds that discussions and statements made in the
course of such explorations prior to the back pay hearing, including
statements made to Board agents to the effect that the claimants
would waive reinstatement, are not admissible at the hearing so as
to bar reinstatement, or toll back pay. Thus, such statements do not
relate to "testimony" within the meaning of section 8 of the Act, as
interpreted under the Jencks rule, but rather they relate to internal
management of the regional office. 176
I " 137 N.L.R.B. 1317, 50 L.R.R.M. 1376 (1962), enforced, 321 F.2d 753, 53 L,R.R.M.
2428 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 923 (1963).
Burinskas v. NLRB, 357 F.2d 822, 827, 55 L.R.R.M. 2300 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
174 160 N.L.R.B. 1692, 63 L.R.R.M. 1177 (1966),
175 H & F Binch Co., 188 N.L.R.B. 720, 76 L.R.R.M. 1735 (1971).
174 Triple AAA Water Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 803, 810 n.10, 53 L.R.R.M. 1153 (1963). See
also Alleyne, The "Jencks Rule" in NLRB Proceedings, 9 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L, Rev. 891
(1968). If such statements were held to relate to "testimony," then, under the "Jencks Rule"
they could be used at the hearing to impeach the testimony of the particular witness. The
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Where a respondent is unable to agree with the Board's regional
office upon the amount of back pay due under a Board order, a
supplemental hearing is conducted , to determine the amount.'"
Prior to 1957, such a supplemental proceeding was initiated merely
by the issuance of a notice of hearing. Since 1957 the Board has
accompanied the notice of hearing with a back pay specification
setting forth the regional office's evaluation and computation of back
pay, including 'such elements as gross back pay, interim earnings,
allowable expenses incurred by the employee, and deductions for
periods of unavailability for employment, and culminating in a
figure representing net back pay.' 78
 The respondent is required to
file an answer within fifteen days admitting, denying or explaining
each element of the specification, 179
 thus placing in issue those
elements upon which there is a disagreement. The respondent must
specifically meet the substance of the allegations which he has de-
nied and a general denial will not suffice.' 8° Failure to deny any
allegation constitutes an admission and the Board may make a
finding thereon without taking evidence."' The burden of proof
respecting gross back pay rests upon the General Counsel, while the
respondent bears the ultimate burden of proving mitigating
factors. 182
 The regional director may issue a notice of hearing with-
out a specification, in which case the respondent need not file an
answer.
Board orders are not self-enforcing and, consequently, in the
event that the respondent refuses to comply, the Board must petition
for enforcement of its order in an appropriate court of appeals. 183
Alternatively, the respondent may petition for review of the Board's
order. The procedure is slightly different in a back pay case. Al-
though the court of appeals retains jurisdiction following the entry
of its decree, the Board has the power under section 10 of the Act to
conduct formal proceedings without court authority to ascertain the
precise amount of back pay.' 84
 Following the formal back pay
hearing, the Board prepares a motion for entry of a supplemental
decree specifying the amount of back pay due. In its motion, the
Board requests the entry of a preliminary procedural order directing
effect, therefore, of this policy is to preclude the use of such statements to frustrate the public
rights protected via the back pay remedy.
177 29 C.F.R. * 102.52 (1968).
174 29 C.F.R. * 102.53 (1968).
175 29 C.F.R. § 102.54(a) (1968).
la° 29 C.F.R. § 102.54(b) (1968).
181 29 C.F.R. § 102.54(c) (1968). See Triton Constr. Co., 194 N.L.R.B. 452, 78
L.R.R.M. 1703, supplementing 191 N.L.R.B. 376, 77 L.R.R.M. 1702 (1971).
182 See text at notes 188-206 infra.
183 See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.13-.15 (1968).
184 NLRB v. Royal Palm Ice Co., 201 F.2d 667, 31 L.R.R.M. 2308 (5th Cir. 1953).
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the respondent to file a response and supporting memorandum stat-
ing in detail any objections it has to the granting of the Board's
motion within a time to be fixed by the court. In this connection, the
Board suggests that the respondent be allowed thirty days to file a
response. The Board also requests the court to fix 'a time after the
Board's receipt of the respondent's response and supporting
memorandum within whichthe Board may file an answering
memorandum, again suggesting a thirty-day period. The Board
furnishes the court with an original and eight copies of a proposed
supplemental decree, together with an entire supplemental certified
record consisting of the pleadings and testimony upon which the
supplemental order of the Board was entered.' 85
A novel procedural ruling resulted in the 1973 United Aircraft
Corp. decision of the Board. 186
 At the back pay hearing, the charg-
ing party moved the administrative law judge to order the respon-
dent company to make whole immediately those employees whose
back pay specifications were not disputed by the respondent's an-
swer. The administrative law judge denied the motion, and excep-
tions were filed to her ruling with the Board. The Board affirmed
the administrative law judge's ruling, because it would not effec-
tuate Board policy to issue interim or fragmented orders. However,
in its decision, the Board stated that, having determined the
amounts of back pay, the large time lapse since the commission of
the unfair labor practices could allow further delay by the respon-
dent to undermine the back pay remedy. Therefore, in the event of
respondent's failure to comply immediately with the Board order,
the Board stated that
the General Counsel could, at his discretion, petition the
Court of Appeals for appropriate immediate interim relief
under Sec. 10(e) of the Act to require Respondent forthwith
to pay the uncontested amounts of back pay due to the
claimants preliminary to seeking enforcement of the Board
Order concerning the remaining amounts of back pay that
Respondent has disputed.'"
B. Burden of Proof in Back Pay Proceedings
Throughout the history of back pay proceedings under the Act,
there has been no dispute that the Board bears the burden of
proving the gross amount of back pay due each claimant. There has,
165 This procedure is undertaken pursuant to 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.141-.16 (1968) and the
appropriate rules of court.
166 United Aircraft Corp., 204 N.L.R.B. No. 131, 83 L.R.R.M. 1616 (1973).
157 83 L.R.R.M. at 1617.
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however, been some confusion about which party must carry the
burden of proving the amount of interim earnings, the availability of
employment for the particular claimant, or the extent to which the
claimant may have suffered willful loss of earnings. The United
States Supreme Court addressed these issues in the Phelps Dodge
case.' 88 In this case, the Supreme Court approved the Second
Circuit's exclusion from the back pay award of "willful losses."'"
Since Phelps Dodge, the Board has considered, in the computation
of back pay awards, the questions whether the employer would have
had work available for the discriminatee had no unfair labor prac-
tice occurred and whether the discriminatee had willfully incurred a
loss of earnings. 190 However, the Board has placed the burden of
alleging and proving such affirmative defenses upon the employer,
and the Board's allocation of such burden has been consistently
upheld by the courts of appeals. As the Ninth Circuit observed in
NLRB v. J.G. Boswell Co.:' 91
While it is true that the Board should order deductions
from back pay on account of "clearly unjustifiable refusal
to take desirable new employment," the matter of showing
a basis for such deductions is an affirmative defense which
must be put in issue by respondents and is in no sense a
part of the Board's case. 192
In Nabors v. NLRB' 93 the Fifth Circuit held that "[p]roof that the
employer had no available jobs was an affirmative defense and the
burden of establishing it rested upon the employer." 194
Notwithstanding the unequivocal allocation to the employer of
the burden of proof respecting the availability of employment and
willful loss of earnings, the actual practice of the Board has had a
moderating effect upon the impact of such allocation. Thus, the
Board has followed a policy of producing claimants for examination
by all parties wherever the employer has raised the defense of willful
loss. Moreover, the Board has reduced or denied back pay awards
to claimants who have been shown by the Board's own investigation
to have incurred willful losses even if the employer itself has taken
no steps to meet its burden of proof.'" Where the Board has been
159 313 U.S. 177 (1940).
199 See text at notes 10-14 supra.
199 The rule that back pay liability depends upon the availability of work in the
respondent's plant was observed by the Board even before Phelps Dodge. See Ray Nichols,
Inc., 15 N.L.R.B. 846, 5 L.R.R.M. 171 (1939).
191 136 F.2d 585, 12 L.R.R,M. 776 (9th Cir. 1943).
192 Id. at 597, 12 L.R.R.M. at 785.
193 323 F.2d 686, 54 L.R.R.M. 2259 (5th Cir. 1963).
1 " Id. at 690, 54 L.R.R.M. at 2262.
195 Ozark Hardwood Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 1130, 41 L.R.R.M. 1243 (1957), enforced in
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unable to locate a claimant, and thus has been unable to satisfy itself
that he has not incurred willful losses, it has historically placed his
award in escrow until he has appeared and the employer has been
afforded an opportunity to cross-examine on the issue of willful loss.
In NLRB v. Brown & Root, inc., 196 the Eighth Circuit approved
the escrow provisions of the Board's order relating to twenty-eight
nontestifying claimants and decreed that the escrow should be con-
tinued in force for a period of one year after the decision became
final. Disbursements from escrow should be made only upon appli-
cation by or on behalf of a claimant and only after the Board had
made such claimant available for examination.
While in effect shouldering much of the burden placed by law
upon the employer respecting the issue of willful loss, the Board has
taken the position that its efforts are performed in the public interest
and are, as to the employer, purely gratuitous and not a matter of
obligation. In Brown & Root, 197 the Board had characterized as
"advisory and cooperative" the function of the General Counsel in
producing discriminatees to testify at the back pay hearing. In
affirming this decision the Eighth Circuit observed that the Board
could have required immediate payment to nontestifying claimants
and that its action in placing such claims in escrow pending exami-
nation went beyond its obligations under the law and "was
beneficial rather than prejudicial to respondents."'"
In 1965 the Second Circuit, in NLRB v. Mastro Plastics
Corp., 199 departed from precedent and declared that the General
Counsel's custom of producing the discriminatees at a back pay
hearing was a legal obligation and an ingredient of the prima facie
case. In considering the issues of willful loss and availability of
work, the court distinguished between the ultimate burden of proof
and the more immediate burden of going forward with the evidence.
Respecting the ultimate burden of persuasion, the Second Circuit
adhered to the universal view that this burden is the employer's.
The court placed the burden of going forward on the question of
available work upon the employer and required the General Counsel
to produce evidence on the issue of willful loss. Noting that informa-
tion as to willful loss is peculiarly within the knowledge of the
discriminatees themselves and, moreover, that the General Counsel
normally has prehearing contact with the discriminatees, the Mastro
part, 282 F.2d 1, 46 L.R.R.M. 2823 (8th Cir. 1960); East Texas Steel Castings Co., 116
N.L.R.B. 1336, 38 L.R.R.M. 1470 (1956), enforced, 255 F.2d 284, 42 L.R.R.M. 2109 (5th
Cir, 1958).
196 311 F.2d 447, 52 L.R.R.M. 2115 (8th Cir. 1963).
197 Brown & Root, Inc., 132 N.L.R.B. 486, 48 L.R.R.M. 1391 (1961).
199 311 F.2d at 455, 52 L.R.R.M. at 2121.
199 354 F.2d 170, 60 L.R.R.M. 2578 (2d Cir. 1965).
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Plastics court held, in specific disagreement with the decision of the
Eighth Circuit in Brown & Root, that the General Counsel must
produce testimony by each discriminatee before the award to such
discriminatee becomes final. The court was careful to state that its
decision did not disturb the requirement that an employer must raise
the affirmative defense in its pleadings, nor did it condemn the
Board's practice of requiring payment of gross back pay into escrow
for claimants who fail to appear at the initial hearing, and did not
preclude the Board's reliance upon other evidence in the event a
claimant was deceased or otherwise unable to testify.
Other courts of appeals have declined to subscribe to the Mastro
Plastics formula and have adhered to the traditional allocation of
the burden of proof. The Fifth Circuit, for example, has questioned
the realism of a rule imputing to the Board the employees' knowl-
edge about their efforts to find interim work and has concluded that
it would be an "intolerable burden" to require the Board to call
every claimant, particularly where large numbers of employees were
involved and little or no basis appeared to dispute the Board's
calculations set forth in the back pay specification. 2°° In Hickman
Garment Co., 201 where the back pay claimant did not appear at the
hearing although subpoenaed by the General Counsel, the Board
held that where it appeared that there was little additional informa-
tion which the employer could acquire by examining the claimant on
the witness stand, she was entitled to the amount set forth in the
back pay specifications. The Board further provided that if the
claimant could not be located within one year, the money would be
returned to the employer with the understanding that this return of
the money would not extinguish the employer's back pay liability. 202
The Fourth Circuit, also declining to follow the lead of the Second
Circuit, observed:
To say that the opponent of one who has the burden of
proof, nevertheless, has the burden of producing evidence
for his adversary Is in reality to shift the burden of proof.
This we are unwilling to do in light of overwhelming
authority that the burden of proof rests on the employer. 203
The Board, for its part, has indicated that it will, in forums
200 NLRB v. Mooney Aircraft, Inc., 366 F.2d 809, 813-14, 63 L.R.R.M. 2208, 2211 (5th
Cir. 1966); NLRB v. Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 360 F.2d 569, 575-76, 62 L.R.R.M.
2155, 2159 (5th Cir. 1966).
2°1 196 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 80 L.R.R.M. 1684 (1972).
2" Cf. Robert Haws Co., 161 N.L.R.B. 299, 63 L.R.R.M. 1302 (1966), See also Mastro
Plastics Co., 354 F.2d 170, 60 L.R.R.M. 2578 (2d Cir. 1965).
103 Florence Printing Co. v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 216, 223, 65 L.R.R.M. 2047, 2052 (4th
Cir. 1967).
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other than the Second Circuit, adhere to its traditional allocation of
the burden of proof. 204
 Thus the rule, as adopted by the Board, is
that the General Counsel's function in producing back pay claimants
for examination by the respondent is merely advisory and
cooperative. 205 As the Board stated in Mastro Plastics:
[W]hile the general burden of proof is upon the General
Counsel to establish the damage which has resulted from
Respondent's established discriminatory discharges, i.e.,
the gross back pay over the back pay period, the burden of
proof is upon the Respondent as to the diminution of
damages, whether from the willful loss of earnings by the
failure to either look for or keep a substantially equivalent
job or from the unavailability of a job, at respondent's
plant for some reason unconnected with the
discrimination. 206
In this case, the administrative law judge tolled back pay for the
specific quarters in which he found that there was no substantial
evidence that the claimant looked for work. This was an incorrect
standard, since the administrative law judge treated each quarter as
a completely severable period, divorced from all others, for the
purpose of determining the reasonableness of the claimant's job-
seeking efforts. Rather, the entire back pay period must be
scrutinized to determine whether, in the light of all circumstances
(among other things a 61 year-old woman located in an area where
there was a lack of opportunity for a woman with her skills and
experience), there had been a reasonable continuing search so as to
foreclose a finding of willful loss:
V. SPECIAL SITUATIONS
A. Back Pay Awards in Strike Situations
The principle was early established that strikers, whether
economic or unfair-labor-practice strikers, are not entitled to back
pay for periods when they were on strike. In one of its earliest
decisions, 207
 the Board drew a clear distinction between employees
204 Hickman Garments Co., 196 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 80 L.R.R.M. 1684 (1972); Fib-
reboard Paper Prods. Corp., 180 N.L.R.B. 142, 148, 72 L.R.R.M. 1617, 1623 (1969);
Heinrich Motors, Inc., 166 N.L.R.B. 783, 65 L.R.R.M, 1668 (1967).
205 Cornwall Co., 171 N.L.R.B. 342, 343, 68 L.R.R.M. 1200, 1201 (1968).
206 136 N.L.R.B. 1342, 1346, 50 . L.R.R.M. 1007, 1008, enforced, 354 F.2d 170, 60
L.R.R.M. 2578 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 972 (1966).
20' Sunshine Hosiery Mills, 1 N.L.R.B. 664, 1 L.R.R.M. 49 (1936). See also Hickman
Garment Co., 172 N.L.R.B. 1168, 69 L.R.R.M. 1517 (1968), enforced, 408 F.2d 379, 71
L.R.R.M. 2048 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969).
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discriminatorily discharged and other employees who struck in pro-
test of such unfair labor practice. The dischargees were awarded
back pay from the date of their discharge but the strikers were held
entitled to back pay only from the date of their unconditional
application for reinstatement. Several years later the Supreme Court
endorsed this policy in Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB. 208 In Volney
Felt Mills, Inc., 209 the Board stated that it would adhere to this
practice no matter how flagrant the unfair labor practices might be,
observing that a contrary policy would encourage, and place a
premium upon, the resort by employees to industrial strife in order
to obtain redress of wrongs rather than promote recourse to the
orderly administrative process established by the Act.
To state it briefly, then, the period of back pay for a striker
begins when he makes an unconditional application for reinstate-
ment and ends when the employer offers him reinstatement to his
former or a substantially equivalent position, or when it appears
that no work is available for him. 2 " The remedy depends upon the
unconditional nature of the request for reinstatement. The expres-
sion of a mere conditional availability for work will not trigger any
obligation on the part of the employer.'"
Looking at the other side of the coin, neither will an offer of less
than full reinstatement satisfy the employer's obligation and toll the
running of back pay. 212 In Knickerbocker Plastic Co., 213 the Board
held that an offer to reinstate strikers as "new employees" tolled
back pay liability only to the extent of the starting wage rate and
that the employer continued to be liable for the difference between
the starting rate and the rate with the employees' seniority taken
into account.
This principle of a partial satisfaction of the employer's obliga-
2" 313 U.S. 177 (1941). If the employer refuses the offer of unconditional reinstatement,
a continuation of the strike will not be considered a willful loss of earnings if the strikers
accept suitable work in the area and take reasonable measures to find work. Madison Courier,
Inc., 180 N.L.R.B. 781, 788, 76 L.R.R.M. 1802, 1803 (1970).
209
	
N.L.R.B. 908, 18 L.R.R.M. 1422 (1946), enforced, 162 F.2d 204, 20 L.R.R.M.
2195 (2d Cir. 1947).
210 Madison Courier, Inc., 180 N.L.R.B. 781, 788, 76 L.R.R.M. 1802, 1803 (1970).
2 " Crosby Chems., Inc., 85 N.L,R.B. 791, 24 L.R.R.M. 1481 (1949), enforced in part,
188 F.2d 91, 27 L.R.R.M. 2541 (5th Cir. 1951).
It should be noted that there is a significant difference between economic and unfair labor
practice strikers respecting entitlement to reinstatement. Economic strikers are entitled to
reinstatement only if they have not been permanently replaced by their employer. NLRB v.
MacKay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938). Unfair labor practice strikers are entitled to
reinstatement even if they have been replaced and even if their reinstatement necessitates the
discharge of the replacement. Remington Rand Corp., 40 N.L.R.B. 1100, 10 L.R.R.M. 92
(1942).
212 Kohler Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 1434, 57 L.R.R.M. 1148 (1964), enforced, 345 F.2d 748,
58 L.R.R.M. 2847 (D.C. Cir, 1965).
213 132 N.L,R.B. 1209, 48 L.R.R.M. 1505 (1961).
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tion applies also in a case where the less-than-full offer is accepted.
In Mooney Aircraft, Inc., 214 where the employer reinstated unfair-
labor-practice strikers but placed them on a reduced work week to
permit the retention of strike replacements, the Board awarded back
pay in the amount representing the difference between what the
employees received for a reduced work week and what they would
have received for a normal work week.
Despite the employer's failure to offer reinstatement to the
entire group of strikers, his back pay liability is tolled as to those
strikers who are offered reinstatement but choose to continue their
strike. This rule was announced in a 1969 Board decision, South-
western Pipe, Inc., 215 which overruled prior law denying the
efficacy of piecemeal offers of reinstatement to unfair-labor-practice
strikers to toll back pay. Since the failure to offer group reinstate-
ment to strikers who have made an unconditional offer to return to
work is a section 8(a)(3) violation, strikers who refuse reinstatement
to protest such discrimination continue to be unfair-labor-practice
strikers. The Board believed that the entitlement to reinstatement as
a result of this status was sufficient, without awarding back pay.
The dissent was concerned about the protection of the strikers as a
group and criticized the divisive effect of this change in the law. 2 ' 6
This tolling of back pay does not change the principle that a group
request by unfair-labor-practice strikers for reinstatement is not
made conditional by insistence that all be reinstated. 217 Therefore,
back pay will accrue for individual strikers until the employer
makes an offer of reinstatement.
The limits of the Southwestern Pipe doctrine are drawn in My
Store, Inc. 218 Back pay is tolled only when the employer's offer of
reinstatement to less than the whole group is without a discrimina-
tory motive. The Board refused to toll back pay for those employees
offered reinstatement where the court of appeals had found that the
employer's anti-union animus revealed that the piecemeal offers
were knowingly defiant of the court's enforcement order.
Entitlement to back pay may be affected by any misconduct so
grave as to warrant a denial of reinstatement by the employer. In
214 148 N.L.R.B. 1057, 57 L.R.R.M. 1133 (1964).
215 179 N.L.R.B. 364, 72 L.R.R.M. 1377 (1969), enforced in part, denied in part and
remanded in part, 444 F.2d 340, 77 L.R.R.M. 2317 (5th Cir. 1971). The Board decision
overruled Robert S. Abbott Publishing Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 1328, 51 L.R.R.M. 1500 (1962),
enforcement denied, 331 F.2d 209, 55 L.R.R.M. 2994 (7th Cir. 1964), and cases relying on it.
216 179 N.L.R.B. at 365-67, 72 L.R.R.M, at 1381-82 (dissenting opinion).
211 National Business Forms, Inc., 189 N.L.R.B. 964, 77 L.R.R.M. 1026 (1971), en-
forced, 457 F.2d 737, 79 L.R.R.M. 2945 (6th Cir. 1972).
218 181 N.L.R.B. 321, 76 L.R.R.M. 1773 (1970), modified, 468 F.2d 1146, 81 L.R.R.M.
2225 (7th Cir. 1972).
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such situations the Board balances the seriousness of the misconduct
against the seriousness of the employer's violations of employee
rights and the resultant provocation of the employees. 219
 The mis-
conduct which defeats reinstatement and back-pay rights may itself
be in the nature of a strike. The Board has held, for example, that
employees entitled to reinstatement and back pay by reason of
discriminatory suspensions forfeited the right to reinstatement and
tolled the running of back pay by participating in a strike held to be
unlawful by reason of a contractual no-strike clause. 22 °
The right to reinstatement, by its terms, presupposes the avail-
ability of work to be performed. It is commonplace during a strike,
however, that an employer's operations are curtailed to such an
extent that they cannot immediately be resumed afterwards. In the
first place, there is the normal delay arising from logistical and
administrative problems connected with the resumption of full pro-
duction after a period of inactivity and confusion. Secondly, there is
the possibility that jobs may have been eliminated by reason of the
permanent loss of orders during a lengthy strike. The Board and the
courts historically have treated the two situations differently for
back-pay purposes. In recognition of the normal delay inherent in
the resumption of full operations, the Board usually orders back pay
to begin five days after the strikers have submitted their uncondi-
tional applications for reinstatement. 22 ' The courts have upheld the
five-day period as being within the discretion of the Board and have
rejected arguments that it is punitive or unreasonably short. In
NLRB v. Trinity Valley Iron & Steel Co., 222 where the strike was in
protest of the employer's unfair labor practices, the Fifth Circuit
commented that:
[t]he duty of reinstatement, the practical problems growing
out of replacement of employees hired during the strike,
and any confusion or plant inefficiencies related to the
assimilation of a large number of former employees after a
somewhat extended absence due to the strike are all a
foreseeable "direct byproduct" of the employer's violation
of the Act . . . 223
The Board does not order immediate reinstatement or the im-
219
 See Kohler Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 1434, 1435, 57 L.R.R.M. 1148, 1149 (1964).
225
 Mid-West Metallic Prods., Inc., 121 N.L.R.B. 1317; 42 L.R.R.M. 1552 (1958).
221
 When the Board first addressed itself to this problem, it ordered back pay to begin
when the application for reinstatement was made. Sunshine Hosiery Milts, 1 N.L.R.B. 664, 1
L.R.R.M. 49 (1936). The five-day grace period was instituted in Tiny Town Togs, Inc., 7
N.L.R.B. 54, 2 L.R.R.M. 236 (1938).
222
 290 F.2d 47, 48 L.R.R.M. 2110 (5th Cir. 1961).
223
 Id. at 48, 48 L.R.R.M. at 2111.
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mediate accrual of back pay, however, where work is simply not
available at the conclusion of a strike. The Board, for example,
refused to order back pay for a replaced economic striker during the
period between his unconditional application (on which date no
work was available for him) and his recall four months later, when
work became available. 224
 In cases involving unfair-labor-practice
strikers for whom no work was available on the date of their
unconditional application, the Board has ordered the strikers placed
on a preferential hiring list and has tolled their back pay as of the
time of such placement. 225
Respecting the economic striker for whom no work is available
at the time of his unconditional application for reinstatement, the
courts until recently have declined to place upon employers any
continuing obligation to seek out economic strikers for whom no
work is available as job vacancies arise or to prefer them in any way
in the matter of future employment. 226
 The Supreme Court, how-
ever, has enlarged the rights of economic strikers in this respect in
NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co. 2 ^ 7 In overruling the Ninth Circuit,
the Supreme Court rejected the concept that an economic striker's
right to reinstatement is to be measured only in the limited context
of the employment situation as it exists on the date on which
reinstatement is requested. In Fleetwood, six strikers were denied
reinstatement upon their application on the ground that jobs were
then unavailable due to the curtailment of production caused by the
strike. Although the strikers indicated .their continuing availability
for employment, the employer, some six weeks after the strike
ended, hired six new employees for jobs which the striker-applicants
were qualified to fill. The strikers were reinstated two months later
and the Board ordered back pay for the two-month period on the
ground that the employer had discriminated against them by hiring
the new employees for jobs which the strikers were qualified to fill.
The Supreme Court characterized as error the contrary view of the
Ninth Circuit that the rights of strikers expired as of the date of
their initial application for reinstatement, when no work was avail-
able for them. Mr. Justice Fortas, speaking for the Court, observed
that the "basic right to jobs cannot depend upon job availability as
of the moment when the applications are filed. 5)228 Noting that
strikers normally apply for reinstatement immediately after the end
224 Jack C. Robinson, 129 N.L.R.B. 1040, 47 L.R.R.M. 1127 (1960).
225 Walsh-Lumpkin Wholesale Drug Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 294, 46 L.R.R.M. 1535 (1960).
226 NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 366 F.2d 126, 63 L.R.R.M. 2155 (9th Cir. 1966);
NLRB v. Brown & Root, Inc., 311 F.2d 447, 52 L.R.R.M. 2115 (8th Cir. 1963); Teamsters
Local 200 v. NLRB, 233 F.2d 233, 38 L.R.R.M. 2095 (7th Cir. 1956).
227 389 U.S. 375 (1967).
228 Id. at 381.
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of a strike and before full production is resumed, the Court went on
to hold that lijf and when a job for which the striker is qualified
becomes available, he is entitled to an offer of reinstatement. The
right can be defeated only if the employer can show 'legitimate and
substantial business justifications.' " 229
The thinking of Fleetwood was extended in Laidlaw Corp., 230
where the Board overruled prior cases which restricted the rights of
replaced economic strikers to nondiscriminatory treatment of their
applications for new employment:
We hold, therefore, that economic strikers who uncon-
ditionally apply for reinstatement at a time when their
positions are filled by permanent replacements: (1) remain
employees, (2) are entitled to full reinstatement upon the
departure of replacements unless they have in the mean-
time acquired regular and substantially equivalent em-
ployment, or the employer can sustain his burden of proof
that the failure to offer full reinstatement was for legiti-
mate and substantial business reasons. 23 '
The remedial aspects of strike situations are often complicated
by unlawful discharges, either of those already on strike or of other
employees who then make common cause with the strikers. As to
the discharged striker, back pay does not commence on the date of
the discharge, but only if and when the employee abandons the
strike. Thus, the discharged striker is in no better position than any
other striker respecting back pay. The Board's theory is that when
an employee has voluntarily chosen to withhold his services by
striking, his loss of earnings cannot conclusively be attributed to his
later discharge during the strike until he indicates a desire to return
to work. 232 Entitlement to back pay does arise, however, when the
strike ends, whether or not the dischargee makes an individual
application for reinstatement. 233 Entitlement likewise arises where
229 Id. For the general method of computing gross back pay in strike situations, see notes
31-35 supra,
23° 171 N.L.R.B, 1366, 68 L.R.R.M. 1252 (1968), enforced, 414 F.2d 99, 71 L.R.R.M.
3054 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970).
231 171 N.L.R.B. at 1369-70, 68 L.R.R.M. at 1258. See Universal Servs., Inc., 184
N.L.R.B. No, 42, 76 L.R.R.M. 1327 (1970), enforcement denied on other grounds, 467 F.2d
579, 81 L.R.R.M. 2492 (9th Cir. 1972); Sea View Indus., Inc., 127 N.L.R.B. 1402, 46
L.R.R.M. 1212 (1960).
232 Astro Electronics, Inc., 188 N.L.R.B. 572, 76 L.R.R.M. 1530 (1971); Sea-Way
I3istrib., Inc., 143 N.L.R.B. 460, 53 L.R.R.M. 1326 (1963); E.A. Holcombe, 140 N.L.R.B.
618, 52 L,R.R.M. 1090, enforced in part, 325 F.2d 508, 54 L.R.R.M. 2739 (5th Cir. 1963);
Central Okla. Milk Producers Ass'n, 125 N.L.R.B. 419, 45 L.R.R.M. 1133 (1959), enforced,
285 F.2d 495, 47 L.R.R.M. 2294 (10th Cir. 1960); Mastro Plastics Corp., 103 N.L.R.B. 511,
518-19, 31 L.R.R.M. 1494 (1953).
233 Universal Servs., Inc., 184 N.L.R.B. No. 42, 76 L.R.R.M. 1327 (1970), enforcement
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the dischargee unequivocally abandons the strike, even in the case
of an economic striker who is replaced between his discharge and his
abandonment of the strike. 234
 However, the abandonment of a
picket line, without more, is not considered tantamount to the
unequivocal abandonment of a strike and does not trigger the back
pay liability. 235
The distinction between an individual's rights as a striker and
as a discriminatee is illustrated in the Board's decision in Sakrete of
Northern California, Inc. 236 The Board there held that where em-
ployees were unlawfully discharged during a strike and then aban-
doned the strike prior to the employer's offer to reinstate them, the
reinstatement offer satisfied the employer's obligation and tolled
back pay, which was then computed from the date on which the
employees abandoned the strike until the date of the employer's
offer. The Board observed, however, that if the employees had not
abandoned the strike prior to the employer's offer, no back pay
would have accrued and the employer would have remained obli-
gated to reinstate the employees upon application. It can thus be
seen that the employees' rights as dischargees were controlling in the
situation as it existed (where the strike had actually been aban-
doned), while their rights as strikers were controlling in the
hypothetical situation constructed by the Board (where the strike
continued). In Paterson Steel & Forge Co., 237 the Board was pre-
sented with a close issue as to the status of unfair-labor-practice
strikers who returned to the plant in response to the employer's
instructions but were never put to work and were discriminatorily
discharged after a fracas provoked by the employer. The Board held
that their status as strikers had ended with their physical return to
the plant and awarded back pay from the date of their discharge
rather than from the date of their subsequent application for rein-
statement. The Board has yet to recognize strikers as constructive
dischargees as a result of an employer's harassment or flagrant
unfair labor practices to entitle them to back pay for the period of
the strike. 238
denied on other grounds, 467 F.2d 579, 81 L.R.R.M. 2492 (9th Cir. 1972); Sea View Indus.,
Inc., 127 N.L.R.B. 1402, 46 L.R.R.M. 1212 (1960).
2" Central Okla. Milk Producers Ass'n, 125 N.L.R.B. 419, 45 L.R.R.M. 1133 (1959),
enforced, 285 F.2d 495, 47 L.R.R.M. 2294 (10th Cir. 1960).
235 United States Cold Storage Corp., 96 N.L.R.B. 1108, 29 L.R.R.M. 1011 (1951).
236
 140 N.L.R.B. 765, 52 L.R.R.M. 1103 (1963), enforced, 332 F.2d 902, 56 L.R.R.M.
2327 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965).
237 96 N.L.R.B. 129, 28 L.R.R.M. 1492 (1951).
238
 King Radio Corp., 172 N.L.R.B. 1051, 70 L.R.R.M. 1204 (1968), enforced with




Respecting employees who join a strike following their dis-
criminatory discharge, the Board includes the strike time in the back
pay period for purposes of computing gross back pay. 239 In Mer-
chandiser Press, Inc., 240 the Board refused to accept the employer's
contention that discharged employees would not, in any event, have
worked during the strike, holding: "Because the Respondent's un-
lawful discrimination has made it impossible to ascertain whether
these employees would have gone on strike in the absence of such
discrimination, the uncertainty must be resolved against the
Respondent." 24 ' However, while participation in a strike does not
automatically defeat the right to back pay, it can affect the amount
recoverable if the employer can sustain the burden of showing
willful loss in that the strike hampered the efforts of discharged
employees to mitigate damages by seeking new employment. 242 But
evidence that a discriminatorily discharged employee has engaged in
picketing, taken alone, is not sufficient to establish such willful
loss. 243
Where discriminatorily discharged employees refuse reinstate-
ment unless the employer meets certain conditions, they thereby
place themselves in the status of strikers and toll the accrual of back
pay. This is so even though the conditions are limited to the remedy-
ing of unfair labor practices. For example, where discriminatorily
discharged employees refused to return to work unless the employer
also reinstated other discriminatees, the Board held that they be-
came unfair-labor-practice strikers who thereupon forfeited their
right to further back pay. 244 The transformation of status from that
of a discriminatee to that of a striker can occur even in the absence
of a rejected offer of reinstatement. Where unfair-labor-practice
strikers who had once been discriminatorily denied reinstatement
testified at a Board hearing that they would be unwilling to return to
work unless the employer recognized the union, the Board denied
them back pay from the date on which they so testified until the date
on which they again applied for reinstatement. 245
239 See, e.g., Ozark Hardwood Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 1130, 41 L.R.R.M. 1243 (1957).
249 115 N.L.R,B. 1441, 38 L.R.R,M. 1105 (1956).
241 Id. at 1442, 38 L.R.R.M. at 1106.
242 NLRB v. Cowell Portland Cement Co., 148 F.2d 237, 16 L.R.R.M. 586 (9th Cir.
1945); Bon Hennings Logging Co., 132 N.L.R.B. 97, 48 L.R.R.M. 1327 (1961), enforced in
part, 308 F.2d 548, 51 L.R.R.M. 2085 (9th Cir. 1962).
243 Rice Lake Creamery Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 1113, 58 L.R.R.M. 1542 (1965).
244 George W. Ball, 134 N.L.R.B. 1007, 49 L.R.R.M. 1268 (1961), vacated and re-
manded sub nom. Wheeler v. NLRB, 314 F.2d 260, 52 L.R.R.M. 2138 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Olin
Indus., Inc., 86 N.L.R.B. 203, 24 L.R.R.M. 1600 (1949), enforced, 191 F.2d 613, 28
L.R.R.M. 2474 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 919 (1952).
245 James Thompson	 Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 456, 30 L.R.R.M. 1299 (1952), enforced in
part, 208 F.2d 743, 33 L.R.R.M. 2205 (2d Cir. 1953).
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B. Back Pay in Subcontracting Cases
It has long been a well-established precept that the subcontract-
ing of bargaining unit work for anti-union purposes is a violation of
section 8(a)(3). The principle that economically motivated subcon-
tracting of unit work is a mandatory subject for collective bargain-
ing, and that failure to bargain about such subcontracting can be a
violation of section 8(a)(5), is of more recent origin. 246 Where the
Board orders a resumption of the subcontracted operation it also
orders back pay. For example, the Board's decision in Hugh
Major247
 found a violation where an employer discriminatorily dis-
continued the operation of certain trucking services with its own
employees, and contracted for the services to be performed by leased
operators. The Board's order required the employer to resume oper-
ation of the service with its own employees and to reinstate the
drivers with back pay. In fashioning this remedy, the Board pointed
out that the case, although in a borderline area, involved an ar-
rangement which was essentially a subcontracting, rather than a
discontinuance, of an operation inasmuch as the trucking operation
was still required in the employer's business and was still being
performed albeit on a contracted basis. Thus the Board reasoned
that a status quo ante remedy was appropriate, whereas it might not
have been in the case of an actual discontinuance of trucking ser-
vices.
When the employer is ordered to bargain about the effect on the
245 In its first look at the Fibreboard case, the Board held that economically motivated
subcontracting of bargaining unit work was a prerogative of management and not a manda-
tory bargaining subject, dismissing a complaint under § 8(a)(5) of the Act. 29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(5) (1970); Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 130 N.L.R.B. 1558, 47 L.R.R.M. 1547
(1961). Several years later, in Town & Country Mfg, Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1022, 49 L.R.R.M.
1918 (1962), enforced, 316 F.2d 846, 53 L.R.R.M. 2054 (5th Cir. 1963), the Board overruled
its Fibreboard decision. Although Town & Country involved discriminatory motivation, the
Board specifically held that the unilateral subcontracting would have violated § 8(a)(5) even in
the absence of discrimination. On the basis of Town & Country, the Board reconsidered the
Fibreboard case and found a violation of § 8(a)(5). 138 N.L.R.B. 550, 51 L.R.R.M. 1101,
affd sub nom. Machinists Local 1304 v. NLRB, .322 F.2d 411, 53 L.R.R.M. 2666 (D.C. Cir.
1963), affd, 379 U.S. 203 (1964). The Board ordered a restoration of the status quo ante,
requiring the employer to reinstitute the subcontracted operations, to reinstate the employees
who had been terminated, and to pay them back pay in an amount equal to the earnings they
normally would have received.
The argument that the Board's remedy contravened the provision of § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. §
160(c) (1970), that "no order of the Board shall require the reinstatement of any individual—or
the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was suspended or discharged for cause
." was rejected by the Supreme Court. The Court concluded that the limitation did not
prevent the Board from fashioning a remedy where an unfair labor practice had been
committed even though, as in this case, the subcontract and the resultant terminations were
economically motivated. 379 U.S. at 217.
247 129 N.L.R.B. 322, 46 L.R.R.M. 1543 (1960), enforced in part, 296 F.2d 466, 48
L.R.R.M. 2595 (7th Cir. 1961).
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employees and the resumption of operations rather than to restore
the subcontracted work, the back pay formula of Wittock 'Supply
Co.'" may be used. Since it is assumed that there would be no loss
of work before the employer fulfilled his bargaining duty, back pay
is allowed from the
date of the unfair labor practice to the occurrence of the
earliest of one of the following events, (1) reaching mutual
agreement with the Union relating to the subjects which
Respondent is herein required to bargain about; (2) a bona
fide impasse in such bargaining; (3) the failure of the Union
to commence negotiations within five days of the receipt of
the Respondent's notice of its desire to bargain with the
Union; or (4) the failure of the Union to bargain thereafter
in good faith. 249
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. 250
 applied the principle that
back pay should be measured by the earnings of replacements or
comparable employees in the context of a subcontracting case. The
Board decided to use the standard of the contract rates immediately
before the subcontracting rather than the negotiated wages when the
employer finally bargained about this issue. Since it is unclear what
the results would have been had the employer bargained originally,
the employer, who is responsible for this uncertainty, must assume
the costs. The six-year lag before the negotiations, plus the standard
factors of the company's limited duty in bargaining, its concern for
preserving the economic benefits of the subcontracting, and the
union's interest in avoiding impasse, influenced the Board determi-
nation.
The Board's decisions in the subcontracting area evidence a
clear disinclination to follow any sort of mechanical approach in the
matter of remedy. On the contrary, the Board has tailored its
remedies to fit the particular fact situations presented, which have
often been complicated by the interests of third parties and by
equitable considerations running counter to purely legal considera-
tions. Thus where a tempering of the conventional remedy has been
indicated by the presence of unusual factors, the Board has declined
to order a return to the status quo ante or the reinstatement of
displaced employees and has even decreed an abbreviated back pay
period.
249
 171 N.L.R.B. 201, 68 L.R.R.M. 1043 (1968), enforced sub nom, Teamsters Local
328 v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 688, 72 L.R.R.M. 2654 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
249
 171 N.L.R.B. at 204, 72 L.R.R.M. at 1048.
299
 180 N.L.R.B. 142, 72 L.R.R.M. 1617 (1969), enforced, 436 F.2d 908, 75 L.R.R.M.
2609 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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In Carl Rochet, 251 the Board found a violation of section
8(a)(5), but not of section 8(a)(3), when two employers who pub-
lished weekly newspapers closed their composing rooms and subcon-
tracted their composition work. This action was taken in concert
with several other weekly newspapers and involved the purchase by'
the group of a new and recently perfected offset press. In connection
with this venture, two new companies were formed, one to operate
the new press for all of the participating newspapers and the other
to perform the cold-type composition necessary for the offset print-
ing process. ,Although finding an unlawful refusal to bargain about
the change in operations, the Board, in recognition of unusual and
mitigating factors, declined to order a return to the status quo ante
or to award reinstatement or back pay, but instead, limited its
remedy to an order to bargain about the effects of the change. The
Board was persuaded that the change, which involved the automa-
tion of certain operations, was the result of important and desirable
technological improvements and that the employers, by reason of
their precarious economic condition, were faced with a choice of
adopting the new process or going out of business. The Board's
disinclination to order a return to the status quo ante was height-
ened by the involvement in the joint venture of other employers not
parties to the proceeding.
In Jersey Farms Milk Service, Inc., 252 the Board found a
violation of section 8(a)(5) when an employer unilaterally subcon-
tracted its transportation operations and laid off its transport driv-
ers. The Board declined to order a restoration of operations in view
of the history of harmonious labor relations between the parties, the
absence of any anti-union motivation, the economic hardship that a
restoration order would work upon the employer and upon innocent
third parties, and the employer's subsequent willingness to bargain
with the union about the subcontracting and its effects. The remedy
adopted by the Board included an order to bargain about the sub-
contracting, including possible resumption of the operations, and
back pay for a four-week period. The four-week limitation on back
pay was not arbitrarily established but was grounded, as was the
remainder of the remedy, in the employer's obligation to bargain
about the subcontracting. Four weeks after the violation occurred,
the employer had met with the union and discussed only the ques-
tion of reinstating the drivers. Although the parties did not bargain
to an impasse on that occasion concerning the subcontracting, the
Board held that, to the extent that reinstatement of the employees
251 136 N.L.R.B. 1294, 49 L.R.R.M. 1972 (1962). This case is frequently known as the
Renton News Record case.
252 148 N.L.R.B. ,1392, 57 L.R.R.M. 1166 (1964).
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was discussed, the employer had discharged its duty to bargain on
that aspect of the matter. The Board concluded that the full mea-
sure of back pay relief was not warranted in the circumstances of
this case and tolled back pay as of the date of such meeting.
There have been other cases in which the Board has awarded a
less-than-full measure of back pay and has adopted a less-than-full
time span as the boundary of the back pay period. In Cities Service
Oil Co., 253 the Board found a violation of section 8(a)(5) when an
employer cancelled forty-five accounts and entered into a distribu-
tion agreement with another oil company under which he serviced
the accounts. There were no layoffs or discharges but there was a
substantial loss of customary overtime work by unit employees.
Recognizing the economic motivation underlying the subcontract
and the hardship that would result to the other company and its
employees under a status quo ante remedy, the Board refused to
order restoration of the direct delivery system but limited its remedy
to an order that the employer reimburse the affected employees for
their lost overtime pay for a period of one year. The parties at the
hearing had agreed to limit the matters to be litigated to a one-year
period immediately following the transfer of accounts. The Board
adopted the one-year period as an appropriate delimitation of the
back pay period since it felt that, in any event, reduction in over-
time earnings beyond one year could not reasonably be attributed to
the employer's unilateral action in view of the cumulative effect of
other changes in the employer's operation.
The Board has imposed full back pay liability when it has
found that the subcontracting violates section 8(a)(1) and (3), as well
as section 8(a)(5). In Dodson's Market, Inc., 254 the reduction in
working hours linked to the subcontracting was part of an anti-
union campaign. Consequently, the Board rejected the Trial
Examiner's reasons for not awarding back pay, that is, the remedy
of a bargaining order and the economic gain resulting from the
subcontracting.
It is not unusual in subcontracting cases for the employees
whose work has been unlawfully subcontracted to be offered other
jobs by the offending employer, or even to be offered the same work
by the subcontractor. Two questions arise in connection with such
offers. First, does the offer of another job by the offending employer
either moot the violation or mitigate the back pay liability? Second,
does an offer of the subcontractor to employ the discriminatees on
the subcontracted work qualify as an offer of interim employment,
refusal of which constitutes willful loss of earnings? The Board has
251 158 N.L.R.B. 1204, 62 L.R.R.M. 1175 (1966).
254 194 N.L.R.B. 192, 78 L.R.R.M. 1628 (1971).
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answered both questions in the negative, but has encountered oppo-
sition from the courts of appeals.
In Brown Transportation Corp.,'" the Board considered a situ-
ation in which employees terminated as the result of an unlawful
subcontract were offered employment by the subcontractor. The
employer had subcontracted the operations of its Atlanta terminal
and discharged fifty-eight employees. The action was taken unilat-
erally and for the purpose of avoiding the obligation to bargain with
a local of the Teamsters. Before effectuating the subcontract, the
employer advised the affected employees that they had been recom-
mended for employment with the subcontractor. The subcontractor
thereafter called each of the employees and stated that jobs were
available for them if they desired employment. The Board found
violations of section 8(a)(3) and (5) and ordered the employer to
resume its terminal operations and reinstate the employees with full
back pay, notwithstanding the rejection by the employees of the
subcontractor's offer of employment. In refusing to toll back pay on
the day the offer was rejected, the Board expressed its rationale as
follows:
To hold that employees who have been discriminatorily
discharged must, under peril of sustaining willful loss of
employment, cooperate with a wrongdoing employer by
accepting less than the full reinstatement which is their
due, while the effects of that employer's unlawful conduct
remain unremedied, would provide a discrimination-
minded employer with a ready device whereby he might be
assured of the benefit of his unlawfulness while being in-
sured against its costs. 256
The Fifth Circuit, while enforcing the Board's order generally,
disagreed with the Board's view on the back pay question and
refused to enforce that portion of the order. 257
In Bon Hennings Logging Co., 25 K an employer unilaterally con-
summated an agreement purporting to be a lease of its trucking
operations to one of its foremen and discriminatorily discharged its
trucking employees. After taking over the operations the foreman
offered jobs to the discharged employees, which they rejected. The
Board found that the arrangement was not a bona fide lease but that
the foreman continued to conduct the operations as agent of the
255 140 N.L.R.B. 954, 52 L.R.R.M. 1151 (1963), modified and enforced, 334 F.2d 243,
55 L.R.R.M. 2878 (5th Cir. 1964).
256 140 N.L.R.B. at 958, 52 L.R.R.M. at 1154.
257 334 F.2d at 245, 55 L.R.R.M. at 2879.
258 132 N.L.R.B. 97, 48 L.R.R.M. 1327 (1961).
280
BACK PAY REVISITED
employer. It ordered the employer to cease and desist from its
unlawful conduct and to reinstate the discharged employees with
back pay. The Board held that the offer of employment by the
foreman-agent did not toll back pay. Although these offers in reality
emanated from the employer itself, for whom the foreman was
acting as agent, they were not offers of employment in connection
with which the employees' former rights would be restored and thus
did not qualify as offers of reinstatement. Nor were they valid as
offers of interim employment. In this connection, the Board stated
that since the offers were made by an agent of the culpable employer
posing as a new employer, it would not effectuate the policies of the
Act to require the employees to cooperate with the culpable em-
ployer by accepting such offers.
In National Food Stores, Inc., 259 the Board again refused to
toll back pay on the basis of an employer's offer of other employ-
ment to employees whose jobs were eliminated by an unlawful
subcontract. About two weeks before unlawfully subcontracting its
inventory work, the employer conducted personal interviews with
the inventory clerks whose jobs were being eliminated. During these
interviews each such employee was offered employment elsewhere in
the company with the understanding that there would be no loss of
wages but without any definite understanding as to precisely what
the other job would be. Each employee indicated an unwillingness
to accept other employment with the employer. In view of the
unlawful elimination of their original jobs the Board held that they
were not required to cooperate with the offending employer by
accepting such other employment and that their refusals did not toll
back pay. A court of appeals, this time the Seventh Circuit, again
took issue with the Board's view of the back pay question and
refused to enforce that portion of the order. 26°
C. Back Pay in Cases Involving Plant Closures
and Relocations
In Textile Workers v. Darlington Manufacturing Co., 261 the
Supreme Court held that an employer may completely terminate his
business for anti-union reasons without violating section 8(a)(3) of
the Act. The Court also held that an employer may partially termi-
nate his business for anti-union reasons provided that the purpose
and effect is not to "chill unionism" in the remainder of the business.
The Board has concluded, however, that the Supreme Court's Dar-
2" 142 N.L.R.B. 340, 53 L,R.R.M. 340 (1963), modified and enforced, 332 F.2d 249, 56
L.R.R.M. 2296 (7th Cir. 1964).
260
	 F.2d at 253, 56 L,R.R.M. at 2298.
261 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
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lington decision does not suggest that the collective bargaining re-
quirement of the Act is inapplicable to such a partial closing, and
has held that an employer must bargain about the decision to
terminate part of his business as well as about the effects of such
action upon the bargaining unit employees. 262
 The refusal to bar-
gain about a partial termination, then, continues to be a violation of
section 8(a)(5) of the Act, just as a partial termination motivated by
a desire to chill unionism in the remainder of the business continues
to be a violation of section 8(a)(3).
In cases involving unlawful partial shutdowns, the Board's
remedies, including back pay features, reflect an effort to tailor the
remedy to fit the particular fact situation presented in each case. In
general, there is a significant difference between the remedies
fashioned in cases involving anti-union motivation and those in
cases involving economically motivated action taken without bar-
gaining. In cases involving disCriminatory motivation, the Board is
more inclined to order a restoration of the status quo ante, or, in
cases where that is impractical or impossible, an extensive back pay
liability designed to compensate for the absence of the optimum
remedy. The Board decisions in Bonnie Lass Knitting Mills, Inc. 263
and St. Cloud Foundry & Machine Co.'" are illustrative of situa-
tions wherein the Board has utilized a broad back pay remedy in the
absence of an order to restore the status quo ante. In Bonnie Lass an
employer discriminatorily discontinued its manufacturing operation,
discharged fifty employees and continued in business as a jobber. In
St. Cloud an employer unlawfully closed down the foundry portion
of its operation, resulting in the refusal of reinstatement to ten
strikers. Neither case involved a restoration remedy. In both cases,
however, the Board ordered the employers to pay the discriminatees
back pay from the date of the discrimination until the date they
secured substantially equivalent employment and to place them on a
preferential hiring list to insure their recall in the event their em-
ployers decided to resume the discontinued operations. 265
2 h 2
 Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561, 63 L.R.R.M. 1264 (1966). The general
implications of this case have been somewhat qualified by the Board's recent decision in
General Motors Corp., 191 N.L.R.B. 950, 77 L.R.R.M. 1537 (1971), affd sub nom. Local
864, UAW v. NLRB, 470 F.2d 422, 81 L.R.R.M. 2439 (D.C. Cir. 1972). In this case, the
Board indicated that the employer's sale of his business was not a mandatory subject of
bargaining. For a full discussion of the implications of this case, see Swift, Plant Relocation:
Catching Up with the Runaway Shop, 14 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 1135, 1145-47 (1973).
263
 126 N.L.R.B. 1396, 45 L.R.R.M. 1477 (1960).
264
 130 N.L.R.B. 911, 47 L.R.R.M. 1412 (1961).
265
 According to Saginaw Aggregates, Inc., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 78, 81 L.R.R.M. 1025
(1972), the preferential hiring list must be in writing, include the names of the individual
employees, and be furnished to the union and the listed employees to toll the employer's back
pay liability. In contrast, an employer's oral promise at the time of the lay-off to rehire the
employees as soon as possible was adjudged insufficient.
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In other cases this basic remedy has been varied to fit unique
fact situations. In Missouri Transit Co., 266
 where an employer dis-
criminatorily discontinued the operation of a shuttle bus line, the
Board ordered the employer to reinstate the discharged drivers in
other bus operations as jobs became available and to pay them back
pay until such reinstatement. In J.M. Lassing, 267 where an em-
ployer, for discriminatory reasons, accelerated the economically
planned discontinuance of its transportation operation, the Board
fashioned an alternative remedy dependent upon a determination to
be made at the compliance stage as to the employer's operational
policy. If the employer's policy was to reassign displaced drivers to
other jobs, the order would require it to offer such other employ-
ment with back pay to the date of such offer. If the employer had no
such policy, the order would require it to bargain with the union
about possible job transfers and to pay back pay to the dis-
criminatees from the date of their discharge until the date on which
they would have been discharged for nondiscriminatory reasons.
In Savoy Laundry, Inc., 268
 upon a remand from the Second
Circuit, the Board articulated the theories underlying its back-pay
orders predicated upon the securing of new employment. Savoy
involved the discriminatory discontinuance by a laundry employer
of its wholesale shirt operation resulting in the discharge of seven-
teen employees. In its original decision 269
 the Board ordered a
restoration of the operation, a preferential hiring list, and, for those
employees for whom no vacancies existed, back pay until they
secured substantially equivalent employment elsewhere. The Second
Circuit, however, deleted the restoration order from the remedy and
remanded the case to the Board for further consideration of the back
pay issue, expressing concern about the lack of a definite time
limitation in the Board's back pay order. 27 ° In its supplemental
decision, 271
 the Board retained the back-pay order in its original
form despite the deletion by the court of the restoration portion of
the remedy. The Board explained, however, that all of the estab-
lished back pay rules governing the conduct of discriminatees, such
as the necessity to seek interim employment and the set-off of
interim earnings, are applicable to this type of remedy. The Board
also noted that this remedy, even with its extensive back pay fea-
ture, falls far short of a restoration of the status quo ante, since the
266
 116 N.L.R.B. 587, 38 L.R.R.M. 1301 (1956), enforced, 250 F.2d 261, 41 L.R.R.M.
2256 (8th Cir. 1957).
267
 126 N.L.R.B. 1041, 45 L.R.R.M. 1430 (1960).
268
 148 N.L.R.B. 38, 56 L.R.R.M. 1450 (1964).
269 137 N.L.R.B. 306, 50 L.R.R.M. 1127 (1962).
279
 NLRB v. Savoy Laundry, Inc., 327 F.2d 370, 55 L.R.R.M. 2285 (2d Cir. 1964).
271
 148 N.L.R.B. 38, 56 L.R.R.M. 1450 (1964).
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new employment which terminates back pay liability will not afford
the employees the protection of their seniority and other rights and
privileges which would have attended a return to their old jobs.
It should be borne in mind that the back pay remedy discussed
in the foregoing paragraphs is predicated upon a finding of a dis-
criminatory motive underlying the partial shutdowns in question
and that the determination as to the legitimacy of the actions in-
volved might well have been otherwise in the post-Darlington era.
In A.C. Rochat Co., 272 for example, the Board initially found viola-
tions of §§ 8(a)(1), (3) and (5) in an employer's shutdown of its sheet
metal operation and, although declining to restore the status quo
ante, ordered back pay to run until the laid-off employees obtained
substantially equivalent employment elsewhere, or with the offend-
ing employer in the event it resumed the sheet metal operation.
Reconsidering its decision in the light of Darlington, the Board
reversed itself on the section 8(a)(3) issue and found that the shut-
down violated section 8(a)(5) only.'" Accordingly, the Board
modified its order to provide that back pay should commence in
each case on the date of layoff and terminate on the date on which
the sheet metal operation was terminated.
Turning to a consideration of other cases involving a unilateral
but economic decision to close down part of a business, it may be
observed that the back pay remedy in such cases is geared, as the
violation is directed, toward the bargaining obligation. 274 For ex-
ample, in Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 275 the Board found a violation
of section 8(a)(5) where the employer unilaterally discontinued its
cheese processing and packaging operation, resulting in the termina-
tion of six employees. In view of the economic nature of the change
and the existence of evidence that the discontinued operation may
have become outmoded, the Board did not order a restoration of the
status quo ante. The Board did, however, order the employer to
bargain about the possible resumption of the discontinued operation
as well as about the effects of the change upon the unit employees.
272 150 N.L.R.B. 1402, 58 L.R.R.M. 1242 (1965).
273 163 N.L.R.B. 49, 64 L.R.R.M. 1321 (1967).
174 ILGWU v. NLRB, 463 F.2d 907, 80 L.R.R.M. 2716 (D.C. Cir. 1972), enforcing as
modified 182 N.L.R.B. 958, 74 L.R.R.M. 2501 (1970), presents an exception to this generali-
zation. Where the union learned of the relocation but did not request the employer to bargain,
the Board ended the back pay period at the approximate date that the union received this
information rather than the date of impasse in the Board-ordered negotiations. The Board
also limited back pay recipients to employees terminated within the six-month § 10(b) statute
of limitations. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1970). However, the court of appeals tolled the statute of
limitations to include employees laid off after the last collective bargaining session on the basis
of the employer's fraudulent assurance to the union that a final decision to close had been
made.
27$ 147 N.L.R.B. 788, 56 L.R.R.M. 1266 (1964).
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As a preface to its back pay order, the Board observed that, if the
employer had complied with its bargaining obligation in the first
instance, the shutdown might have been avoided and that, in any
event, it must be presumed that the employees would have retained
their jobs at least until the employer had fulfilled its bargaining
obligation. Proceeding on the basis of this rationale, the Board
ordered back pay for the affected employees, such obligation to
cease upon any of the following occurrences: (1) reaching mutual
agreement with the union relating to the subjects about which the
employer is ordered to bargain; (2) bargaining to a genuine impasse;
(3) the failure of the union to commence negotiations within five
days of the receipt of the employer's notice of its desire to bargain
with the union; or (4) the failure of the union to bargain thereafter in
good faith. 276
 In addition to tying the back pay remedy to the
fulfillment of the bargaining portion of the order, the Board also
provided that back pay should cease in the event the employer
should resume the discontinued operation and offer proper rein-
statement to the employees involved.
In Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 277 the Board found a refusal
to bargain about the effects of a partial shutdown and prescribed, in
addition to a bargaining order, a back pay order similar to that in
Winn-Dixie but limited to the narrow area of bargaining wherein
the violation occurred—i.e., the effect of the shutdown upon unit
employees. Further explicating the rationale underlying this type of
back pay provision, the Board stated that it could not assure mean-
ingful bargaining under its order without first restoring some mea-
sure of economic strength to the union, since the employer should
have bargained at a time when it was still in need of the employees'
services. In order to assure such meaningful bargaining without
disturbing the existing economic posture of all concerned, 276 the
Board ordered the fourfold Winn-Dixie type back pay remedy, but
also provided that in no event should the sum paid to any employee
exceed the amount he would have earned from the date of the
partial shutdown until the date on which he secured equivalent
employment elsewhere, or the date on which the employer went out
of business, whichever occurred sooner.
In its later decision in Transmarine Navigation Corp., 279
 the
Board, addressing itself to another unilateral partial shutdown,
adopted the same remedial order as that utilized in Royal Plating,
276 Id. at 792, 56 L.R.R.M. at 1268.
277 160 N,L.R,B. 990, 63 L.R.R.M. 1045 (1966).
276 The employer went out of business completely several months after the unilateral
partial closing.
276 170 N.L.R.B. 389, 67 L.R.R,M. 1419 (1968).
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adding a proviso that in no event should the amount of back pay be
less than the affected employees would have earned during a two-
week period of employment with the respondent. Voicing the prin-
ciple that the wrongdoer, rather than the victim, should bear the
consequences of his own unlawful conduct, the Board stated that
the back pay portion of its remedy constituted an attempt "to
re-create in some practicable manner a situation in which the par-
ties' bargaining position is not entirely devoid of economic conse-
quences for the Respondent. n 9280
A second variation on Royal Plating appears in Summit Tooling
Co, 281
 The section 8(a)(5) violation was deemed to be the refusal to
bargain about the effects of a closing, which was economically
motivated. The Winn-Dixie criteria for setting the end of the back
pay period were considered appropriate. However, back pay was
awarded only to four employees who were laid off, not transferred,
at the date of the closing.
In Ozark Trailers, Inc., 282 the Board refused to adopt a trial
examiner's recommendation in favor of a Winn-Dixie type back pay
remedy on the ground that it was too speculative in the particular
circumstances of the case at bar. Ozark Trailers involved the unilat-
eral shutdown of one plant in a multiplant operation. The Board
was satisfied that the employer's decision was prompted solely by
pressing economic necessity. 283
 Back pay was ordered for the af-
fected employees from the date on which the decision to close was
made to the date on which the plant was actually closed.
The cases involving relocation of operations, as opposed to
shutdowns, also evidence an effort on the part of the Board to mold
remedies designed to fit the particular factual situations presented.
In cases where the relocation is discriminatorily motivated but
where there are strong factors militating against a status quo ante
remedy, the Board customarily orders the offending employer not
only to offer reinstatement at the new location, but also to bear
travel and moving expenses for those employees who elect to accept
the offer of reinstatement. For example, in Bermuda Knitwear
Corp., 284
 the Board found a violation of section 8(a)(3) where an
employer discriminatorily moved its shipping operation from New
York City to Saugerties, New York, and discharged twenty-six
28° Id. at 4, 67 L.R.R.M. at 1421.
281 195 N.L.R.B. 479, 79 L.R.R.M. 1396 (1972), enforced, 83 L.R.R.M. 2044 (7th Cir.
1973).
282 161 N.L.R.B. 561, 63 L.R.R.M. 1264 (1966).
283 In this connection the Board cited the Renton News Record case, 136 N,L.R.B. 1294,
49 L.R.R.M. 1972 (1962), a subcontracting case in which the Board softened its usual remedy
in recognition of the clear economic hardship underlying the decision in question.
284 120 N.L.R.B. 332, 41 L.R.R.M. 1500 (1958).
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shipping and clerical employees. The employer was ordered to rein-
state the employees to their former or substantially equivalent posi-
tions wherever such positions may be located, to pay the travel and
moving expenses of those employees who desired reinstatement, and
to pay back pay to the affected employees from the date of their
discharge until the offer of reinstatement. 285
In cases involving relocations which are economically moti-
vated but are carried out in violation of a bargaining obligation, the
Board often ties the back pay remedy to the fulfillment of the
bargaining obligation in the manner discussed in connection with
partial shutdowns. In Spun-Jee Corp., 286 involving a unilateral relo-
cation of a plant operation from New York City to Bergen, New
Jersey, the Board ordered the employer to bargain about a resump-
tion of the operation in New York, and if the operation were not
moved back to New York as a result of such bargaining, then to
bargain about the effects of the relocation upon bargaining-unit
employees, to offer reinstatement to such employees of their former
or substantially equivalent jobs as may exist at Bergen, and to make
them whole for loss of earnings. In awarding back pay, the Board
followed the Winn-Dixie formula. In other cases involving unilat-
eral plant relocations, the Board has tied the back-pay remedy solely
to reinstatement or to the securing of new employment. Standard
Handkerchief Co. 287 involved the unilateral transfer of plant opera-
tions from New York City to Amsterdam, New York. The Board
adopted the trial examiner's order including an offer of reinstate-
ment at the new location, travel and moving expenses, and back
pay. It was provided that the back pay would cease upon reinstate-
ment at the new location, a failure to notify the employer that such
reinstatement was desired, or the obtaining of other substantially
equivalent employment. 288
Fraser & Johnston v. NLRB 289 considered the issue of wage
rates for back pay and work at the new location. In transferring its
operation a distance of twenty-five miles, the company had ignored
evidence that a majority of the employees would have been willing
to transfer. To avoid violating the section 8(d) prohibition against
compelling contract terms, the Ninth Circuit refused to follow the
Board's decision to impose the rates and benefits established by the
contract which was in effect at the time of relocation. The court
285 See also Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc., 108 N.L.R.B. 1369, 34 L.R.R.M. 1209
(1954).
288 152 N.L.R.B. 943, 59 L.R.R.M. 1206 (1965).
257 151 N.L.R.I3. 15, 58 L.R.R.M. 1339 (1965).
288 See also Die Supply Corp., 160 N.L.R.B. 1326, 63 L.R.R.M. 1154 (1966).
289 469 F.2d 1259, 81 L.R.R.M. 2964 (9th Cir. 1972), enforcing in part and denying in
part 189 N.L.R.H. 142, 77 L.R.R.M. 1036 (1971).
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reasoned that the company would have been unlikely to maintain
these terms had it bargained over the move. Instead, the rates
produced by the Board-ordered bargaining sessions would apply.
The court did enforce the Board's requirement that employees hired
after the relocation be replaced by the original employees who
desired to transfer.
VI. LIABILITY FOR BACK PAY
A. Generally
In most cases, there is no problem on the question of who is
liable on the back pay award: it is the respondent employer, as an
individual, partner, or corporation, or the respondent union, or
both. Two problems can arise, however. The first occurs when the
respondent employer sells his business to a third party, and the
second when a third party, a creditor of the respondent, makes a
claim upon the money paid as back pay. Each of these will be
treated in turn.
B. Liability of Purchasers of Respondent's Business
The Board has traditionally drafted its remedial orders so that
their proscriptions and obligations run not only to a particular
respondent but also to "its officers, agents, successors and
assigns."29 ° During the Board's early years, the Supreme Court had
several occasions to consider the effect of Board orders. upon succes-
sor employers. In Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 29 ' the Court
held that Board orders are, as a matter of law, binding upon
successors or assigns who operate merely as a disguised continuance
of the old employer. Several years later, in Regal Knitwear Co. v.
NLRB, 292 the Court approved the Board's practice of including the
provision relating to successors and assigns in all of its orders as a
matter of course. Although no successor was involved in the Regal
Knitwear case, the Supreme Court addressed itself to the issue in the
abstract because of a conflict between several courts of appeals. In
approving the order of the Board in the Regal Knitwear case,
however, the Court cautioned that the inclusion of the term "succes-
sors and assigns" in the enforcement order could not operate to
enlarge its scope beyond that defined in Rule 65(d) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that injunctions and re-
straining orders are "binding only upon the parties to the action,
their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon
29° Hill Bus Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 781, 800, 1 L.R.R.M. 525, 537 (1937).
391 315 U.S. 100 (1942).
393 324 U.S. 9 (1945).
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those persons in active concert or participation with them who
receive actual notice of the order. . . ."
The Supreme Court did not, in the Regal Knitwear case, at-
tempt to delineate either the characteristics of a successor employer
or the precise circumstances under which a successor would be
bound by a Board order. The Board itself, however, has developed
a body of law relating to successor employers and their obligations.
In determining whether a new employer is the "successor" of the
old, the Board inquires whether there is a substantial continuity in
the business operation; whether the new employer uses the same
plant, machinery and methods of production; whether the same jobs
exist under the same working conditions; whether the new employer
retains the same work force and supervisory hierarchy; and whether
the business manufactures the same product or offers the same
service. 293
The type of successor which has proved most vexing to the
Board is the bona fide purchaser who takes over a business with
knowledge of an unfair-labor-practice proceeding pending against
the seller. In 1947, the Board extended the Regal Knitwear doctrine
to such a successor in Alexander Milburn Co. 294 In Milburn, the
successor acquired the business and assets of the predecessor some
four months before the Board issued its decision in a pending
unfair-labor-practice proceeding, of which the successor had knowl-
edge at the time of the sale. The acquisition was a bona fide sale
and there was no showing that the successor was acting in concert
with the predecessor. In a supplemental decision, the Board held the
successor, as well as the original respondent, liable for the payment
of back pay to four employees and the reinstatement of two of them.
Seven years later, in Symns Grocer Co., 295 the Board reversed
this policy. Reexamining the Supreme Court's decision in Regal
Knitwear, and particularly the discussion therein concerning the
limiting effect of Rule 65(d), the Board concluded that it lacked
statutory authority to hold a bona fide purchaser liable for unfair
labor practices which he did not commit. Three years later in the
Ozark Hardwood case, 296 the Board made it clear that this general
immunity did not apply where the successor was but an alter ego of
the predecessor. Ozark Hardwood involved a scheme to evade the
respondent's obligation through intentional default on a bank loan
and the purchase of the assets at the resultant foreclosure sale by a
293 See, e.g., Valley Nitrogen Producers, Inc., 207 N.L.R.B. No. 41, 84 L.R.R.M. 1424
(1973); Ranch-Way, Inc., 203 N.L.R.B. No. 118, 83 L.R.R.M. 1197 (1973).
264 78 N.L.R.B. 747, 22 L,R,R.M. 1249 (1948),
293 109 N.L.R.B. 346, 31 L.R.R.M. 1570 (1954).
296 Ozark Hardwood Co., 119 N,L.R.E. 1130, 41 L.R.R.M. 1243 (1957).
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new corporation formed for that purpose. In holding the successor
liable for payment of back pay to twenty-seven employees, the
Board stated that, as an alter ego, its liability would have been the
same even if it had not been the instrumentality of evasion. Then, in
.1967, the Board, in Perma Vinyl Carp., 297 reexamined its position
respecting the liability of bona fide purchasers for remedying the
unfair labor practices of their predecessors, and overruled Symns
and reverted to the rule of Alexander Milburn.
Perma Vinyl involved a sale of the corporation's facilities and
business to United States Pipe and Foundry Company during the
pendency of unfair-labor-practice proceedings, of which U.S. Pipe
had knowledge. U.S. Pipe, which continued to operate the business
without substantial change, was neither an alter ego of its predeces-
sor nor a participant in an attempted evasion of the obligations
imposed upon Perma Vinyl by the Board. In holding U.S. Pipe
responsible for remedying the unfair labor practices, the Board
noted that a successor, even if a bona fide purchaser, becomes the
beneficiary of unremedied unfair labor practices and generally is
best able to remedy these violations. In Perma Vinyl, the Board
expressed a disinclination to allow the violator of the Act to shed
responsibility for unfair labor practices despite the sale of its busi-
ness, and announced a policy of placing upon the offending em-
ployer and its successor joint responsibility in the matter of back
pay. 298
An exception to imposing liability on the successor employer,
however, will be made if the work force, because of legitimate
business reasons, has changed to the extent that there are no longer
appropriate jobs available for the discriminatees. 299 The back pay
for an employee discriminatorily terminated is computed as if he had
been employed continuously from the date of his severence, first as
an employee of the original employer, and then as an employee of
the successor."° The courts of appeals have upheld the authority of
the Board, in a back pay proceeding, to consider the derivative
liability of a successor employer without beginning a new unfair-
291 164 N.L.R.B. 968, 65 L.R.R.M, 1168 (1967), enforced in part sub nom. United
States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. NLRB, 442 F.2d 742, 68 L.R.R.M. 2913 (5th Cir. 1968).
298 164 N.L.R.B, at 968, 65 L.R.R.M. at 1169-70. Recently, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed the Board's authority to hold the successor as well as the predecessor employer
liable for back pay. The Court, however, was careful to stress that although the successor was
innocent of any unfair labor practices or collusion, it was fully aware of its predecessor's
wrongdoing when it purchased the company. See Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 42
U.S.L.W. 4039 (U.S. Dec. 5, 1973).
299 UAW v. NLRB, 442 F.2d 1180, 77 L.R.R.M. 2401 (9th Cir. 1971).
3"' Pugh & Barr, Inc., 102 N.L.R.B. 562, 31 L.R.R.M. 1332 (1953).
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labor-practice proceeding even though the successor was not a party
to the original proceeding. 30 '
Where the successor employer unlawfully refuses to hire its
predecessor's employees, there is no question of derivative liability
since it is the successor which violates the Act. There is presented,
however, an interesting question as to whether back pay should be
computed according 'to the predecessor's wage rate or according to
the scale adopted by the successor. The Board addressed itself to
this issue in New England Tank Industries, Inc., 302 where an em-
ployer took over the operation of a tank farm and fuel pipeline
under a government contract. The employer departed from its usual
practice of hiring the employees of the predecessor operator to avoid
paying the contractually established union scale. Instead, the em-
ployer hired new employees and paid them at a lower rate. Reject-
ing the employer's contention that back pay should be computed at
the new rate which it had instituted, the Board computed back pay
at the predecessor's higher union rate, reasoning that the dis-
criminatees would have continued working at that rate had it not
been for the successor's unlawful refusal to hire them and its unilat-
eral change in the rate of pay. The Board likewise refused to accept
the employer's contention that the number of back pay claimants
should be limited to the number of new employees which it had
hired. Holding that the employer had not met its burden of proving,
as to each back pay claimant, that it would not have positions
available for reasons unconnected with the discrimination, the
Board awarded back pay to all fifty-two claimants.
In Chemrock Corp., 303
 the Board considered essentially the
same issue in the context of a section 8(a)(5) case. Chemrock in-
volved the sale of a business with no change in operations. After the
acquisition, the successor employer refused to deal with the bargain-
ing representatives of the company's drivers and advised the drivers
that they would be hired only as "free agents." When the drivers
insisted upon representation by their union, the employer hired new
drivers. The Board held that the predecessor's drivers became the
"employees" of the successor, which was then obliged to bargain
with their representative. In addition to a bargaining order, the
Board ordered the drivers reinstated with back pay. Although the
successor had not assumed the predecessor's contract, the Board
3°1 NLRB v. Mastro Plastics Corp., 354 F.2d 170, 60 L.R.R.M. 2578 (2d Cir. 1965);
NLRB v. C.C.C. Associates, Inc., 306 F.2d 534, 50 L.R.R.M. 2882 (2d Cir. 1962).
302 147 N.L.R.B. 598, 56 L.R.R.M. 1253 (1964).
303 151 N.L.R.B. 1074, 58 L.R.R.M. 1582 (1965).
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once again computed back pay on the basis of the contract rates. In
so doing, the Board stated:
As it is speculative, and cannot be determined, what
rate or rates of pay might have governed their employment
had the Respondent fulfilled its obligation to bargain with
their representative, and as in any event their existing rate
could not have been changed until and unless the Respon-
dent has fulfilled its bargaining obligation, we shall direct
that back pay due them shall be computed at the rate
provided in the contract governing their employee relation-
ship at the time the Respondent acquired the enterprise. 304
Although a successor employer may be obligated for back pay
because of its own discriminatory refusal of employment to its
predecessor's employees, such obligation is contingent upon the em-
ployees' demonstrated desire to work for the successor. In Druwhit
Metal Products Co., 305 for example, the Board declined to order
reinstatement or back pay for certain employees where one of an
employer's operations was sold, although it was probable that, had
the employees applied for employment shortly after the sale, they
would have been denied such. There was no evidence that these
individuals had any interest in being employed by the successor or
that their failure to apply was because they were aware of any
discriminatory hiring policy. The Board refused to base a remedial
order upon any such inchoate right.
The Supreme Court foreclosed a potentially extensive area of
back pay liability for successors in NLRB v. Burns International
Security Services, Inc. 306
 As a consequence of this decision, the
successor's duty to bargain is limited to negotiating with the rep-
resentative of a largely intact bargaining unit during the certification
year and until there is objective evidence to doubt majority rep-
resentation. The Board's expansion of liability requiring the succes-
sor to honor the predecessor's collective bargaining agreement307
was overruled and the make-whole order to compensate the em-
ployees for the loss of contract benefits was vacated.
3" Id. at 1082, 58 L.R.R.M. at 1585.
When a successor who had made a unilateral change in commission rates refused to
reinstate unfair labor practice strikers despite their unconditional offer to return, the Board
ordered reinstatement and back pay based on either the predecessor's or successor's pay
schedule, whichever would be more profitable for individual employees. Spruce Up Corp.,
194 N.L.R.B. 841, 79 L.R.R.M. 1122 (1972).
3°5 153 N.L.R.B. 346, 59 L.R.R.M. 1359 (1965).
306 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
3 ° 7 182 N.L.R.B. 59, 74 L.R.R.M. 1047 (1970), enforcement denied, 441 F.2d 911, 77
L.R.R.M. 2081 (2d Cu. 1971).
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A second major issue in Burns was whether the successor's
unilateral selling of initial terms of employment violated section
8(a)(5). The Court held that it did not. When there has been no prior
employment relationship, the employer is not making changes in his
position. Once a majority of the former employees have been hired
and the employer's status as a successor employer is otherwise clear,
the duty to bargain matures and subsequent changes will be a
violation unless the parties have bargained to impasse. Since the fact
pattern in Burns showed that no changes were made after the unit
was established, the make-whole order was not enforced on that
basis.
A case which was remanded to the Board after the Burns
decision, Ranch-Way, Inc., 3" illustrates a limitation on back pay
orders based on unilateral change by successors. The employer had
made unilateral changes in seniority, vacation, and health benefits
after the duty to bargain arose. Since Burns prohibits the enforce-
ment of the collective bargaining agreement against the successor
and there was no express or implied assumption of the contract, the
Board could not determine monetary losses and therefore could not
formulate a make-whole remedy. The implication is that changes in
wages and other financial benefits would permit such an order.
Burns, however, did designate an exception to the general rule
of allowing the employer to set the initial terms of employment:
when the successor clearly intends to retain the old unit intact, an
immediate duty to bargain results. In NLRB v. Bachrodt Chevrolet
Co., 309 the successor employer offered jobs to all the former em-
ployees, maintaining the existing employment terms. After the em-
ployees were rehired, unilateral changes were made in wages, vaca-
tion pay, and overtime. The Seventh Circuit held that these circum-
stances justified enforcing the Board's order of restitution of the
benefits lost by failure to adhere to the previous terms.
C. Claims of Creditors
An award of back pay is sometimes complicated by the claim of
a third party upon the monies involved. The third party may be a
3°9
	 N.L.R.B. No. 118, 83 L.R.R.M. 1197 (1973).
309 468 F.2d 963, 81 L.R.R.M. 2244 (7th Cir. 1972), enforcing in part 186 N.L.R.B.
1035, 76 L.R.R,M. 1597 (1970). Accord, Howard Johnson Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 98, 80
L.R.R.M. 1769 (1972). Bachrodt was recently vacated by the Supreme Court, 93 S. Ct. 1547
(1973). The case was remanded to the Seventh Circuit in light of Burns. This remand does not
alter the validity of the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of Burns, since the remand is based on
the underlying conviction that the Board, rather than the court, should have the first chance
to reconsider Bachrodt in light of Burns. For a full discussion of these developments, see
1972-1973 Annual Survey of Labor Relations Law, 14 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 1173,
1212-14 (1973).
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creditor of the respondent employer, as in a bankruptcy proceeding,
or of the individual claimant, as in a garnishment proceeding.
The leading case in the area of bankruptcy is Nathanson v.
NLRB, 310
 which arose out of an involuntary petition for bankruptcy
filed against a respondent in a Board case, after a back pay order
had been assessed by the Board but before it had been enforced by a
court of appeals. When the court of appeals enforced the Board's
order, the Board filed a proof of claim which was disallowed by the
referee in bankruptcy. The District Court for the District of Mas-
sachusetts set aside the disallowance 3 " and the Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit affirmed, 312 holding that the Board's order was a
provable claim, that the Board could liquidate the claim, and
finally, that the claim was entitled to a priority as a debt due to the
United States under section 64(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Act. This
holding conflicted with the view taken by the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit in NLRB v. Killoren, 313 and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari. 314 The Court agreed with the Board and the First
Circuit as to the first and second findings but not as to the third.
The Court did not subscribe to the reasoning that because the Board
is an agency of the United States any debt owed it is a debt owing to
the United States. The priority granted by the Bankruptcy Act was
designed to safeguard and secure adequate revenue to sustain public
responsibilities and discharge public debts. The Court noted that a
back pay claim does not involve public revenue since the
beneficiaries are private individuals. The Court went on to distin-
guish Bramwell v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 315 which
granted a priority to a claim of the United States for Indian monies
on the ground that Indians are wards of the United States. In
response to the Board's argument that the interest of the United
States in eradicating unfair labor practices is so great that the back
pay order should be given the additional sanction of priority of
payment, the Court concluded that this would be a legislative, and
not a judicial, decision.
In this connection, it is interesting to note that wages (and back
pay constitutes wages)316 are granted a second priority under the
Bankruptcy Act, limited, however, to $600 and the further restric-
tion that a claim therefor must be filed within three months of the
3 " 194 F.2d 248, 29 L.R.R.M. 2430 (lst,Cir.), rev'd, 344 U.S. 25 (1952).
311 In re MacKenzie Coach Lines, Inc., 100 F. Stipp. 489, 28 L.R.R.M. 2628 (D. Mass.
1951).
3 ' 2 Nathanson v. NLRB, 194 F.2d 248, 29 L.R.R.M. 2430 (1st Cir. 1952).
3t3 122 F.2d 609, 9 L.R.R.M. 584 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 696 (1941).
314 343 U.S. 962 (1951).
3 " 269 U.S. 483 (1926).
316 Social Security Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358 (1946).
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commencement of the proceeding. However, in a Board case, as
pointed out by the dissenting justices in Nathanson, 317
 the claimants
can rarely qualify under this priority because of the long time lag
occasioned by Board proceedings to establish the unlawful character
of the discharge and the necessity of computing back pay thereafter,
either through negotiations or a formal back pay proceeding.
The Court also upheld the Board and the courts below in
denying the trustee's claim that the liquidation or computation of the
back pay award was a matter for the Bankruptcy Court and not the
Board. Under section 10(c) of the Act, the fixing of back pay is one
of the functions entrusted solely to the Board. In this connection the
Supreme Court observed that:
The computation of the amount due may not be a simple
matter. It may require, in addition to the projection of
earnings which the employee would have enjoyed had he
not been discharged and the computation of actual interim
earnings, the determination whether the employee wilfully
incurred losses, whether the back pay period should be
terminated because of offers of reinstatement or the with-
drawal of the employee from the labor market, whether the
employee received equivalent employment, and the like.
. . . Congress made the relation of remedy to policy an
administrative matter, subject to limited judicial review,
and chose the Board as its agent for this purpose. 318
Respecting garnishment proceedings, the weight of authority
favors the proposition that, until a claimant actually receives a back
pay award, his future interest therein may not be attached. In
NLRB v. Sunshine Mining Co., 319 creditors of twenty-three back
pay claimants issued writs of attachment and process of garnishment
upon respondent employer after the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit had issued its decree enforcing the Board's order 32 ° but
before the back pay amounts were liquidated. The Board petitioned
the court to enjoin such action.
The Ninth Circuit held that, although the construction of state
laws pertaining to garnishment generally is a matter for local deter-
mination, the subject matter here was nevertheless within the full
control of the court of appeals until final compliance with the order
of the Board, as enforced by the court's decree. The court pointed
out that if third persons were permitted to obtain fixed rights against
317 Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25, 31-32 (1952).
316 Id. at 29-30.
319 125 F.2d 757, 9 L.R.R.M. 618 (9th Cir. 1942).
32° NLRB v. Sunshine Mining Co., 110 F.2d 780, 6 L.R.R.M. 981 (9th Cir. 1940).
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the employer growing out of back pay awards, the power of the
court to enforce its decree would be subject to partial or complete
frustration. The court then alluded to the fact that the award of
back pay is not a private judgment belonging to the employee, who
has no property right therein pending actual receipt of the award.
Consequently, the court issued an injunction permanently restrain-
ing state litigants from proceeding against the respondent employer
to attach the claimants' prospective awards.
In NLRB v. Stackpole Carbon Co., 321 the Board and the re-
spondent employer, following the entry of the decree of the court of
appeals, entered into a stipulation under which $50,000 was depos-
ited in a bank account under the trusteeship of the Board's Regional
Director to be paid to the back pay claimants in twelve installments.
Many of the claimants had executed assignments of their back
wages in favor of the Department of Public Assistance of the Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania, which had granted the employees
financial aid during the back pay period. The Board sought to void
such executions. The Commonwealth and the Department took the
position that as a result of the Board order and court decree, a
"private" substantive right vested in each employee equal to the sum
awarded to him by the Board and, further, that the employee could
assign, sell or dispose of that right in any manner he saw fit. The
court concluded that if the purposes of the Act are to be effected, the
right of the employee to the back pay award must be deemed to be a
public right. The Board's order cannot be deemed to be complied
with by the respondent until the employee to whom the award is due
has received the money, which money has no private character at all
until it is in the employee's hands. Thus, the right to the award is a
public right and the claimant is paid as a result of the function of a
public body carrying out the intent of Congress. On the basis of this
reasoning, the court of appeals granted the injunction sought by the
Board.
D. Union Responsibility
The Taft-Hartley amendments regarding union unfair labor
practices, also necessitated the proviso to section 10(c) of the Act:
"that where an order directs reinstatement of an employee, back pay
may be required of the employer or labor organization, as the case
may be, responsible for the discrimination suffered by him." 322 The
Supreme Court in Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 323 utilized this
proviso in affirming the validity of sole union liability for back pay
in the hypothetical case where the union, in violation of section
321
 128 F.2d 188, 10 L.R.R.M. 619 (3d Cir. 1942).
322
 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970).
323
 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
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8(b)(2) attempts to cause the employer to discriminate against a
particular employee. The Court interpreted the congressional pur-
pose of the proviso as an attempt to give the Board the power to
remedy union unfair labor practices similar to its power with respect
to employer violations. The union argument that a failure to require
the employer to share the responsibility would frustrate the purpose
of the Act was rejected.
In the more usual case, where the employer is joined in the
proceeding, the union and employer are jointly and severally liable
for back pay. The principle was first established by the Board in H.
M. Newman, 324 where it was held that when both the employer and
union are responsible for the discrimination, they will be jointly and
severally liable without any attempt to apportion liability according
to responsibility for the violation. Union Starch & Refining Co. v.
NLRB 325 explored the legislative history to refute the argument that
the amended section 10(c) allows only the employer or the union to
be held liable for back pay. Stressing the congressional intent to
maintain the Board's discretion in formulating remedies for union
violations, the Seventh Circuit maintained that the proviso phrase,
"back pay may be required of the employer or labor organization,"
does not require limiting the remedy against only one party when
both participated in the discrimination, but does permit joint and
several liability.
The question of refusal to apportion damages in Newman and
Union Starch was reopened in Acme Mattress C0. 326 Here, the
employer's discriminatory discharge and unlawful execution of a
union-security clause were induced by a strike and refusal to sign a
contract. The court deemed the economic coercion no greater than
in Newman and the principle of apportionment remained inappro-
priate. The Board's basic position was that since economic coercion
is not a defense to the unfair labor practice, it should not absolve the
employer of responsibility for remedial back pay. 327 The rationale
i24 85 N.L.R.B. 725, 24 L.R.R.M. 1463 (1949), enforced, 187 F.2d 488, 27 L.R.R,M.
2484 (2d Cir, 1950).
325 87 N.L.R.B. 779, 25 L.R.R.M. 1176 (1949), enforced, 186 F.2d 1008, 27 L.R.R.M.
2342 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 815 (1951).
Acme Mattress Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 1010, 26 L.R.R.M. 1611 (1950), enforced, 192 F.2d
524, 29 L.R.R.M. 2079 (7th Cir. 1951).
327 Chairman Herzog and Member Reynolds, in their dissent, turned to the use of the
word "or" in the § 10(c) proviso, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970), to support their belief that the
congressional intent was for the Board to exercise discretion in assessing back pay liability
against either or both parties according to their relative responsibility for the violations. They
recognized that Newman set the precedent for refusal to make such a determination, but
expressed their belief in the Board's ability to set new policy, The dissenters evidenced greater
faith in the deterrent effect of sole liability on the union. 91 N.L.R.B. at 1021-22, 26
L.R.R.M. at 1617-18 (dissenting opinion).
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was that the acceptance of a defense of economic coercion would
undermine employer resistance to unlawful union demands. Fur-
thermore, sole liability would not be a greater deterrent for unions
since full financial liability is already a contingency under joint and
several liability. Analogizing to the tort doctrine of last clear chance,
the Board underscored the employer's ultimate control in dis-
criminatory hiring and discharges. The shared liability of joint tort-
feasors, despite the presence of duress against one, was seen as
additional support for the Board's holding. Finally, while acknow-
ledging that back pay is a public, not a private right, the Board
hesitated to cut off a source of reimbursement. The courts of appeals
followed the Board in rejecting the coercion argument. 328
While retaining this general principle of joint and several liabil-
ity, the Board has found one party to be primarily liable and the
other secondarily liable under special circumstances. Most common
are those cases where one party has invoked a legal method of
settling the dispute and resorted to the unlawful practice only when
that has failed. In NLRB v. Lexington Electric Products Co., 329
Local 3 of the IBEW called a strike at the company's Lexington
plant with the illegal objective of closing down the Imperial plant,
which was beyond the union's jurisdiction, and bringing the Imper-
ial employees with the Local's jurisdiction. The strike was effective;
Lexington Electric Products closed the Imperial plant and dis-
charged the employees working there. Both the union and the em-
ployer were found to have unlawfully encouraged union member-
ship by these discharges. However, the Third Circuit refused to
enforce the Board order of joint and several liability, noting that the
company had filed an unfair labor practice charge against the union,
which had not led to an end to the strike, before the company
yielded to the union pressure. The court reasoned that where the
employer resists the union pressure to the maximum extent possible,
joint liability will not be a deterrent."° Similarly, in Zoe Chemical
CO., 332 the Board held that the company violated the Act by the
unlawful enforcement of a union-security clause. However, since a
state court arbitrator's award had directed this method of enforce-
ment, the company was held only secondarily liable. 332
3214 NLRB v. Pinkerton's Nat'l Detective Agency, 202 F.2d 230, 31 L.R.R.M. 2336 (9th
Cir. 1953); NLRB v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 192 F.2d 654, 29 L.R.R.M. 2136
(2d Cir. 1951).
329 283 F.2d 54, 46 L.R.R.M. 3028 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 845 (1961).
33° Id. See Bulletin Co., 181 N.L.R.B. 647, 74 L.R.R.M. 1122 (1970), enforced, 443
F.2d 863, 77 L.R.R.M. 2599 (3d Cir. 1971).
331 160 N,L.R.B. 1001, 63 L.R.R.M. 1052 (1966), enforcement denied, 406 F.2d 574, 70
L.R.R.M. 2276 (2d Cir. 1969). The Second Circuit found that these circumstances not only
mitigated the employer's liability, but prevented the finding of a violation.
332 In other cases the union has been found to be primarily liable because of the nature of
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The special problem of the union's inability to correct the
discrimination in the employee's job status to end its back pay
liability was treated in Pinkerton's National Detective Agency. 333
Written notification to the employer that the union wished to cease
discrimination against the employees will toll back pay liability
against the union, despite the employer's refusal to end the
discrimination. 334 Following Pen & Pencil Workers Local 19593 3"
which established the principle that the union must notify both the
employer and discriminatees when it is the sole respondent, the
Board specifiCally held in Iron Workers Local 595 336 that such
notification would toll back pay liability. In discussing this decision
in NLRB v. Teamsters Local182, 337 the Second Circuit did not see it
as a reversal of policy, but an adaptation to the situation where the
employer, not being a respondent, had no incentive to offer rein-
statement to the discriminatee.
The Board's doctrine with respect to union liability for back
pay in strike situations was extensively reviewed in Teamsters Local
901. 338 Since the finding of a section 8(b)(1)(A) violation may be
based upon the misconduct of even a few pickets, the Board was
fearful of chilling the right to strike by imposing back pay liability.
Consequently, the Board exercised its discretion to reject an appro-
the violation. In NLRB v. Operating Engineers Local 138, 293 F.2d 187, 48 L,R.R.M. 2743
(2d Cir. 1961), there were § 8(a)(1) and (3) violations by the employer and § 8(b)(1)(A) and (3)
violations by the union in the maintenance of a closed shop and discriminatory hiring. 29
U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), (3), (b)(1)(A), (3) (1970). The union had been carrying out work stoppages
and otherwise forcing the discharge of union members who were advocating internal union
reform. In Laborers Local 573, 196 N.L.R.B. No. 62, 80 L.R.R.M. 1329 (1972), two unions
cooperated in forcing discriminatory discharges; but the one which was the chief beneficiary
and instigator of the discrimination against non-members of that union was held primarily
liable and the other only secondarily liable.
As a practical matter, the union was made primarily liable in National Cash Register
Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 581, 77 L.R.R.M. 1342 (1971), enforced, 466 F.2d 945, 81 L.R.R.M. 2001
(6th Cir., 1972), when the union had collected the fine imposed on employees who worked
during the strike, although the company had also violated the Act in permitting the imposition
of fines. Although both the union and the employer were liable, the dissenters in National
Cash Register did not feel that the evidence warranted holding the company secondarily
responsible. 466 F.2d at 965, 81 L.R.R.M. at 2018 (dissenting opinion). For a full discussion
of these issues, see 1972-1973 Annual Survey of Labor Relations Law, 14 B.C. Ind. & Corn.
L. Rev. 1173, 1245-48 (1973).
333 90 N.L.R.B. 205, 26 L.R.R.M. 1193 (1950), enforced, 202 F.2d 230, 31 L.R.R.M.
2336 (9th Cir. 1953). Accord, General Am. Aerocoach Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 239, 26 L.R.R.M.
1188 (1950).
334 To toll liability the notification must be unequivocal. See, e.g., Iron Workers Local
426, 192 N.L.R.B. 97, 77 L.R.R.M. 1654 (1971), review denied, 81 L.R.R.M. 2479 (D.C.
Cir. 1972). Similarly, notification does not toll liability if the union continues to discriminate
against the employee, NLRB v. Operating Engineers Local 925, 460 F.2d 589, 80 L.R.R.M.
2399 (5th Cir. 1972).
335 91 N.L.R.B. 883, 26 L.R.R.M. 1583 (1950).
336 109 N.L.R.B. 73, 34 L.R.R,M, 1285 (1954).
337 228 F.2d 83, 37 L.R.R.M. 2174 (2d Cir. 1955).
333 202 N.L.R.B. No. 43, 82 L.R.R.M, 1525 (1973).
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priate, but excessively stringent, remedy in favor of the traditional
section 10(j) injunction or the Laura Modes Company 339
 remedy of
refusal to issue a bargaining order and the direction of an election.
This decision upholds a line of cases from Colonial Hardwood
Flooring34° in 1949 through Operating Engineers Local 513 34 ' in
1963, denying back pay for union interference with the employees'
access to the place of employment. The Teamsters, Local 901 opin-
ion also distinguished two recent cases, National Cash Register
Co. 342 and Teamsters Local 212. 343 While National Cash Register
imposed back pay liability for strike activity, the court felt that the
union's levy of a percentage of the wages of employees who worked
during the strike was a direct interference with the employment
relationship in violation of section 8(b)(1)(A). This type of interfer-
ence was also present in Teamsters Local 212, where three non-
striking employees were laid off when the union president
threatened their safety in a context of violence by the strikers.
The development of the substantive law with respect to a
union's duty of fair .representation has been accompanied by a
consideration of imposing back pay liability for such violations.
Local 485, lUE, 344 discussed this issue extensively. Local 485 had
violated section 8(b)(1)(A) in refusing to process a grievance by an
employee who had dissented from union policy. Since the union had
not complied with the original order to fulfill its obligation, the
Board imposed liability for back pay from the time the grievance
was presented until the fulfillment of the duty of fair representation.
Observing that the company's failure to follow the procedure re-
quired by the collective bargaining agreement made the discharge
questionable, the Board attributed the employee's continued am-
biguous status to the union's subsequent failure to process the griev-
ance. This conclusion justified burdening the union with a back pay
order. The Board rejected the dissent's suggestion that a section 301
suit would be available against the employer and union where the
collective bargaining agreement assigned the employee's cause of
action for breach of contract to the union and required the exhaus-
tion of the contract remedies before bringing suit. The Board also
339 144 N.L.R.B. 1592, 54 L.R.R.M. 1299 (1963).
3" 84 N.L.R.B. 563, 24 L.R.R.M. 1302 (1949).
341
 145 N.L.R.B. 554, 54 L.R.R.M. 1429 (1963). The court reasoned that determining
damages in cases involving personal injuries as well as back pay claims was beyond the
expertise and authority of the Board and could be left to state court police power to remedy.
342
 190 N.L.R.B. 581, 77 L.R.R.M. 1342 (1971), enforced, 466 F.2d 945, 81 L.R.R.M.
2001 (6th Cir. 1972).
343 200 N.L.R.B. No. 83, 82 L.R.R.M. 1165 (1972).
344 183 N.L,R.B. No. 131, 74 L.R.R.M. 1396 (1970), supplementing 170 N.L.R.B.




outlined the limits of section 301 suits in remedying the union's
violation and in neglecting the protection of the arbitration clause.
Basic to the decision was the Board's opinion that its processes
should provide relief without requiring resort to a section 301 suit.
The Second Circuit, in refusing to enforce Local 485, lUE, 34$
echoed the themes of the Board's dissent. The court held that the
Supreme Court's decision in Vaca v. Sipes, 346 requiring apportion-
ment of liability between the employer and the union according to
the damages caused by each, prevented the imposition of sole liabil-
ity on the union for breach of the duty of fair representation. The
court noted that, until there was a determination that the discharge
was improper, a back pay order would appear punitive. A Board
ruling on the validity of the discharge would present jurisdictional
problems. The Second Circuit also deferred an opinion about the
alternative, a Board order based on an arbitrator's determination of
the legality of the discharge and apportionment of damages. The
Second Circuit did enforce the original cease and desist order.
E. Personal Liability of Employer Officers,
Union Officers andlor
Business Agents
Generally, absent special circumstances, such as fraud or situa-
tions in which the corporate officer is a disguised continuance of the
corporation or dissipates corporate assets or intermingles personal
and corporate funds or attempts to evade the back pay obligation,
corporate officers, union officers or business agents have not been
held personally liable for the back pay obligation by the Board or
the federal courts. 347
In Riley Aeronautics, 348 the General Counsel sought to assess
personal liability, naming an officer of a corporation in a back pay
proceeding on the theory that he, rather than the corporation, com-
mitted the unfair labor practice and delayed complying with the
Board order until the corporate respondents (predecessor and suc-
cessor employers) got into financial difficulties. The trial examiner
and the Board did not agree, pointing out that the evidence was not
sufficient to cause the Board to pierce the corporate veil, absent
special circumstances. Furthermore, the Board pointed out that if
345 NLRB v. Local 485, WE, 454 F.2d 17, 79 L.R.R.M. 2278 (2d Cir. 1972), enforcing
170 N.L.R.B: 1234, 67 L.R.R.M. 1609 (1965).
3" 386 U.S. 171, 196-98 (1967),
347 NLRB v. West Texas Util. Co., 206 F.2d 442, 445, 32 L.R.R.M. 2043, 2047 (D.C.
Cir. 1953); NLRB v. Hopwood Retinning Co., 104 F.2d 302, 304, 305, 4 L.R.R.M. 555, 558
(2d Cir. 1939). See also Chef Nathan Sez Eat Here, 201 N.L.R.B. No. 41, 82 L.R.R.M. 1264
(1973).
343 154 N.L.R.B. 340, 59 L.R.R.M. 1796 (1965),
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the officer refused to discharge his duty to satisfy a court-enforced
order, including disbursing corporate funds to meet the corporate
back pay obligation, he risked punishment for contempt. 349
In NLRB v. Local 925, JUDE (J. L. Manta, Inc.), 35°
 the trial
examiner, in a decision adopted by the Board, did assess personal
liability against a union business agent on the theory that he was not
merely implementing the policy of the union but was the architect of
that policy. The trial examiner reasoned that the agent was the
moving force behind the anti-union campaign and should not now
be allowed to plead his representative status as a defense against the
finding of personal liability. However, the court pointed out that the
Board's ruling was a departure from its policy of not holding agents
personally liable."' Accordingly, the court remanded the case to the
Board but the matter was disposed of by agreement among the
parties.
VII. THE BACK PAY REMEDY AND REFUSAL-TO-BARGAIN
SITUATIONS
In refusal-to-bargain cases where the Board can look to a
negotiated, existing, or recent contract to determine damages, the
Board has required the employer to reimburse the employees for loss
of contract benefits. Thus, the Board has ordered an employer to
make whole its employees for losses suffered as a result of a refusal
to execute a contract which has been fully agreed upon by the
payment of contract benefits, 352
 and ordered employers to compen-
sate employees for losses resulting from unilateral changes. 353 In
NLRB v. Strong, 354
 the Supreme Court confirmed the Board's au-
thority to issue back-pay orders in refusal-to-bargain situations. A
finding of bad faith or anti-union conduct is not necessary to issue a
344
	 at 364, 59 L.R.R.M. at 1798.
3"
 460 F.2d 589, 80 L.R.R.M. 2399 (5th Cir. 1972).
351
 NLRB v. Operating Engineers Local 925, 460 F.2d 589, 80 L.R.R.M. 2399 (5th Cir.
1972); United Brewery Workers, 166 N.L.R.B. 915, 65 L.R.R.M. 1704 (1967); Hoisting &
Portable Engineers Local 4, 141 N.L.R.B. 1231, 52 L.R.R.M. 1487 (1963); Marble Polishers
Local 121, 132 N.L.R.B. 844, 48 L.R.R.M. 1439 (1961); Hod Carriers Local 1445, 126
N.L.R.B. 226, 45 L.R.R.M. 1301 (1960); Motion Picture Operators Local 244, 126 N.L.R.B.
376, 377 n.3, 45 L.R.R.M. 1318 (1960). See also Journeymen Local 420, 111 N.L.R.B. 1126,
1127-28, 35 L.R.R.M. 1656, 1657 (1955), enforced, 239 F.2d 327, 39 L.R.R.M. 2176 (3d Cir.
1956); H.E. Stoudt & Sons, Inc., 114 N.L.R.B. 838, 37 L.R.R.M. 1050 (1955).
NLRB v. Strong, 393 U.S. 357 (1969); Beverage-Air Co., 185 N.L.R.B. 168, 76
L.R.R.M. 1711 (1970); Schill Steel Prods. Co., 161 N. L.R.B. 939, 63 L.R.R.M. 1388 (1966);
Huttig Sash & Door Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 470, 475, 58 L.R.R.M. 1433, 1434 (1965), modified
and enforced, 362 F.2d 217, 220, 62 L.R.R.M. 2271, 2272 (4th Cir. 1966).
353
 Petrolane-Franklin Gas Serv., 174 N.L.R.B. 594, 70 L.R.R.M. 1342 (1967); Overnite
Transp. Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 1185, 61 L.R.R.M. 1520 (1966), enforced, 372 F.2d 765, 64
L.R.R.M. 2359 (4th Cir. 1967); Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 1407, 51 L.R.R.M.
1508 (1962), enforced, 324 F.2d 916, 54 L.R.R.M. 2586 (7th Cir. 1963).
354 393 U.S. 357 (1969).
302
BACK PAY REVISITED
make-whole order in these cases. 355 The principle of restitution is
designed to prevent the wrongdoer from benefitting from the unfair
labor practice during the period of breach. Thus, when bargaining is
ordered, the Board restores the employees to the position they would
have been in had the violation not occurred. 356 In establishing the
remedy, contract terms must be observed. 357 Further deference to
the principle of free bargaining is found in the avoidance of restric-
tions on future bargaining. 358
In H.K. Porter v. NLRB 359 the Supreme Court established a
limit on back pay orders for section 8(a)(5) violations by barring the
imposition of substantive contract terms upon either of the parties.
The Court construed section 8(d) as a limit on remedial powers and
evaluated the interplay between sections 8(d) and 10 of the Act:
It would be anomalous indeed to hold that while §8(d)
prohibits the Board from relying on a refusal to agree as
the sole evidence of bad faith bargaining, the Act permits
the Board to compel agreement in the same dispute. The
Board's remedial powers under §10 of the Act are broad,
but they are limited to carrying out the policies of the Act
itself. One of these fundamental policies is freedom of
contract. While the parties' freedom of contract is not
absolute under the Act, allowing the Board to compel
agreement when the parties themselves are unable to do so
would violate the fundamental premise on which the Act is
based—private bargaining under governmental supervision
of the procedure alone, without any official compulsion
over the actual terms of the contract. 36 °
The Court also noted that inadequacy in the Board's present reme-
dial powers must be solved by Congress, not the courts.
IUE v. NLRB (Tiidee) 36 ' was the first major case to adopt the
theory that the Board has the authority to grant a make-whole
remedy to reimburse the work force for the loss of benefits from the
employer's failure to bargain with a newly certified union. 362
 The
355 Zink Co., 196 N.L.R.B. No. 135, 80 L.R.R.M. 1232 (1972); Exchange Parts Co., 139
N.L.R.B. 710, 51 L.R.R.M. 1366, enforced, 339 F.2d 829, 58 L.R.R.M. 2097 (5th Cir. 1965).
35" Zink Co., 196 N.L.R.B. No. 135, 80 L.R.R.M. 1232 (1972).
357 In Beverage-Air Co., 185 N.L.R.B. 168, 76 L.R.R.M. 1711 (1970), it was held that
the employees would be made whole for the loss of benefits which would have accrued to
them under the contract. Since the contract allowed the employer to set the wages for
employees brought into the unit during the contract term, employees who were hired after the
employer's refusal to sign the contract were not included in the back pay order.
35" Petrolane-Franklin Gas Serv., 174 N..L.R.B. 594, 70 L.R.R.M. 1342 (1967).
359 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
364) Id. at 108.
361 426 F.2d 1243, 73 L.R.R.M. 2870 (D,C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 950 (1970).
362 See, e.g., 36 NLRB Ann. Rep. 23, 91-92 (1971); 37 NLRB Ann. Rep. 136-39 (1972);
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Board had issued a traditional bargaining order in this case, and the
union petitioned for further relief. The District of Columbia Circuit
found that the employer's objections to the election were "patently
frivolous." The orienting principle in the opinion was the central
importance in the Act of collective bargaining and the need to devise
adequate remedies for the breach of this duty. The court stressed
that section 10(c) required the Board to take affirmative action
which would fulfill this purpose. The inadequacy of prospective
relief was reflected by the economic benefits to the employer result-
ing from the delay in bargaining and the resulting weakening of the
union. By limiting the remedy to what would actually have been
achieved by the two parties, not to what the Board determines
should have been negotiated, the court believed it had complied
with the law of H.K. Porter. Similarly, the order was a remedy for
past violations, not a present imposition of terms. A further purpose
was to deter unjustified litigation which would burden the courts.
The court of appeals remanded the case to the Board to consider a
make-whole remedy or appropriate alternatives.
The District of Columbia Circuit qualified its position in two
subsequent cases, United Steelworkers v. NLRB (Quality Rubber
Manufacturing Co.) 363
 and Southwest Regional Joint Board, Cloth-
ing Workers v. NLRB. 364
 Where the employer's defense in the section
8(a)(5) case was not frivolous, but presented a debatable issue, the
procedural right to appellate court review prevailed and a make-
whole remedy would not be ordered. As these two cases make clear,
the District of Columbia Circuit considered the legitimacy of the
defense, not the presence of section 8(a)(1) and (3) violations, to be
critical.
Before the Board heard Tiidee on remand, it decided Ex-Cell-0
Corp., 365 a section 8(a)(5) case in which the employer refused to
bargain as the only means of obtaining appellate review of its
objections to an election. A divided Board held that it did not have
the statutory authority to impose a make-whole remedy in such a
case. The Board recognized the inadequacy of the remedy, but
suggested congressional reform and the use of the section 10(j) and
(e) injunction powers to get temporary relief in federal court while
Johannesen, Continuing Controversy: New Remedies for Old Unfair Labor Practices, 23 Lab.
L.J. 100, 105-06 (1972); Swerdlow, Freedom of Contract in Labor Law: H.K. Porter and
Section 8(d), 51 Texas L. Rev. 1, 20-29 (1972); 1970-1971 Annual Survey of Labor Law, 12
B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 1026, 1122-28 (1971); 1971-1972 Annual Survey of Labor Law, 13
B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 1347, 1452-55 (1972).
363 431 F.2d 519, 74 L.R.R.M. 2747 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
364 441 F.2d 1027, 76 L.R.R.M. 2033 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
365 185 N.L.R.B. 107, 74 L.R.R.M. 1740 (1970).
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an unfair labor practice case is pending and during the period of
enforcement. The Board observed that imposing hypothetical con-
tract terms would run counter to the purpose of the Act as clarified
in H.K. Porter. Section 10(c) also barred punitive orders, and the
speculative nature of the remedy risked violating this restriction.
The Board also rejected the subjective distinction made by the court
of appeals in Tiidee between frivolous and debatable challenges,
which distinction would result in excessive litigation and injustice.
The Ex-Cell-0 dissenters, Members McCulloch and Brown,
based their belief in the Board's authority to impose back pay on the
broad power given by section 10(c). A view of this policy as the
promotion of peaceful collective bargaining shaped their opinion.
Reviewing the range of compensatory remedies, the proposed
make-whole relief was seen as merely an extension, differing from
other section 8(a)(5) compensatory orders primarily in the method of
proof. Rather than setting contract terms, it would simply measure
the loss. Only the uncertainty of injury, not damages, would bar
recovery from the wrongdoer. The dissent suggested such means of
measurement as other contracts negotiated in the area by the union
and government wage statistics. The courts of appeals have, how-
ever, followed the majority view and in subsequent cases denied
monetary damages on the basis of Ex-Cell-0. 366
The District of Columbia Circuit granted a summary reversal of
Ex-Cell-0 to the extent it denied make-whole relief, remanding the
case to the Board to determine whether or not the challenge to the
certification presented a debatable issue. 367 Before the Board con-
fronted this challenge, the court issued a supplemental decision
concluding that the objections were debatable and vacated the
remand. 368 When Tiidee reached the Board on remand, 369 it was
the unanimous decision of the Board that it did not have the
authority to grant a make-whole order:
We know of no way by which the Board could ascertain
from the above [area and national contract statistics] what
the parties "would have agreed to" if they had bargained in
good faith. Inevitably, the Board would have to decide
366
 Lipman Motors, Inc., 187 N.L.R.B. 346, 76 L.R.R.M. 1039 (1970), enforced, 451
F.2d 823, 78 L.R.R.M. 2808 (2d Cir. 1971); General Dynamics Corp., 187 N.L.R.B. 679, 76
L.R.R.M. 1540 (1970), enforced, 447 F.2d 1370, 78 L.R.R.M. 2480 (5th Cir. 1971).
367
 Auto Workers v. NLRB (Ex-Cell-0), 449 F.2d 1046, 76 L.R.R.M. 2753 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
366
 Ex-Cell-0 Corp. v. NLRB, 449 F.2d 1058, 77 L.R.R.M. 2547 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
369
 Tiidee Prods., Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. 1234, 79 L.R.R.M. 1175 (1972).
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from the above what the parties should have agreed to.
And this, the court stated, the Board must not do."°
In Tiidee, the Board awarded litigation costs to the union to
deter unfounded refusals to bargain and ordered non-monetary rem-
edies to aid the union in reacquiring its initial strength. These
methods of restoring the status quo included the mailing of notices
to the homes of the employees, allowing the union to use the com-
pany bulletin boards to post organizational material, and requiring
the employer to furnish a list of the employees' names and addresses.
The Board rejected proposals to award pre-election organizational
expenses and union fees and dues which might have been collected
under a union-security agreement.
Other Board decisions have shown that litigation costs will be
awarded only when the insubstantiality of the challenge to the
election allows the inference that the employer's motive was to delay
bargaining."'
CONCLUSION
This article has traced the historical development of the back
pay remedy and has presented a review of the substantive and
procedural aspects of this remedy as it is currently applied by the
National Labor Relations Board. The flexibility of the back pay
remedy has made it adaptable, in one form or another, to many of
the novel and complex situations which constantly challenge the
ingenuity and expertise of the General Counsel and his staff, the
Board and its administrative law judges, and the many private
labor law practitioners who dedicate themselves to the cause of
industrial harmony through the sound administration of national
labor policy.
37°
 Id. at 1235, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1177; Ex-Cell-0 Corp, v. NLRB, 449 F.2d 1058, 77
L.R.R.M. 2547 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Heck's, Inc., 191 N.L.R.B. 886, 77 L.R.R.M. 1513 (1971),
enforced as amended, 476 F.2d 546, 82 L.R.R.M. 2955 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
371 In Heck's, Inc., 191 N.L.R.B. 886, 77 L.R.R.M. 1513 (1971), enforced as amended,
476 F.24 546, 82 L.R.R.M. 2955 (D.C. Cir. 1973), decided the previous year, the Board
rejected the idea of litigation costs on the grounds that the General Counsel has the prime
responsibility for the litigation and the charging party's litigation expenses serve private, not
public, interests. The District of Columbia Circuit amended the order to allow both litigation
costs and organizational expenses, believing that the Board's decision in Tiidee would permit
a remedy when extraordinary organizational costs were attributable to the unfair labor
practices. In Tiidee Prods., Inc., 196 N.L.R.B. No. 27, 79 L.R.R.M. 1692 (1972), the Board
ordered litigation costs on the basis of frivolous election objections. Although the Board made
a like finding in John Singer, Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. No. 7, 80 L.R.R.M. 1340 (1972), litigation
costs were not considered. Instead, the Board ordered the Tiidee non-monetary remedies
provided for the certification year to begin upon the commencement of good faith bargaining,
and required the General Counsel to get § 10(e) relief if the decision were appealed or not
complied with. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1970).
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